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Global Constitutionalism and the 
Constitutionalization of International Relations:
A Reflection of Asian Approaches to International Law
 Surendra BHANDARI※
Abstract
With the emergence of global constitutionalism, domestic laws, policies, and 
administrative practices are demanded to be compatible with international laws. 
International laws are progressively assuming the position of supremacy over 
domestic laws like a constitution. State Parties are not free to eschew their 
obligations from giving effect to international laws. These minimum requirements 
of harmonization, supremacy, and authority of international law are 
constitutionalizing international relations, which has, indeed, already garnered 
the requisite legitimacy. In this regard, one of the obligations as well as 
contributions of Asia can be attributed to its participation in strengthening the 
practice of the constitutionalization of international relations. Against this 
background, this paper examines the nature of the constitutionalism of 
international law in defining and regulating international relations in reference 
to the idea of Asian approaches to international law. The query of what role has 
Asia played in history and what role is it playing in modern times in designing 
and practicing the concept of global constitutionalism might draw different 
paradigmatic responses, ranging from a passive recipient to an active partner and 
a designer of global constitutionalism. Since Asia itself is a vast region with 
heterogeneous genres of thought and varied levels of development, its role may 
well fit into all these paradigms with conceivable peculiarities among its 
members. This paper contends that any claim to modern international law as 
being a product of a single culture or tradition grossly undermines the history of 
international law and the existence of customary practices in different countries 
across the globe who have played innumerable roles in shaping modern 
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international law in terms of its foundational concepts. The analysis and 
arguments of this paper are divided into seven sections. The first section 
discusses the controversy of whether the origin of international law is 
attributable only to a Eurocentric explanation. The second section analyzes the 
relevance, if any, of a spatially fragmented concept like an Asian approach to 
international law. The third section analyzes the basic features of 
constitutionalization as a system of global governance. The fourth section explores 
the concept of constitutionalization from diplomacy to the rules based 
international system. The fifth section explicates a few basic trends of 
harmonization between international law and domestic legal regulatory practices. 
The sixth section discusses the problems and possible trends of global 
constitutionalism. The final section concludes with a notion that despite diversity, 
in all its likelihood, Asia seems to be gradually advancing its role from a 
bystander to the partner of global constitutionalism, in terms of transmuting 
concepts into international rules, harmonizing them at the domestic level, and 
implementing them in practice.
1. Is International Law Eurocentric or Universal?
Rules of international law relating to treaties, war, peace, diplomacy, 
protection of diplomats, consular agencies, systems of arbitration, international 
trade and business, piracy and asylum among others, were historically developed 
in ancient civilizations. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNCHR) mentions that the practice of granting asylum to people fleeing 
persecution in foreign lands is one of the earliest hallmarks of civilization. The 
UNCHR further claims that references have been found in texts written 3,500 
years ago in the Middle East, such as the Hittites, Babylonians, Assyrians, and 
Egyptians.1 Also, the concept of the freedom of high seas and common heritage of 
mankind was already developed in Asia and practiced in the Indian Ocean before 
Grotius developed the same idea in Europe.2
Nevertheless, the European literature written in the area of international law 
is full of assertions of a European prerogative over the origins of modern 
international law. For example, Oppenheim claims that international law as the 
law of the international community of states, “. . . dutifully traces it back to Hugo 
1. See UNCHR, Refugees, available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html visited 
on July 17, 2013.
2. See Garry Buzan & Richard Little, World History and the Development of non-Western 
International Relations Theory, in NON-WESTERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: PERSPECTIVES 
ON AND BEYOND ASIA 213 (Amitav Acharya & Barry Buzan eds., Routledge, 2009).
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Grotius as its father.”3 He purely argues that on the publication of the Law of War 
and Peace,4 all subsequent legal developments between independent states were 
based on the idea of Grotius. Perhaps, Oppenheim accurately visualized the 
colonial and war-ridden undertakings of European states, which drew 
justifications from the Grotian idea of ‘just war.’ However, Oppenheim’s account 
might turn out to be an overstatement because it is far from being reflexive to the 
academic traditions and political practices of non-European countries in the 
world. Similarly, J. G. Stark readily concludes that the early references to 
international law in different parts of the world including in China, Egypt, India, 
and Islamic traditions did not make any serious contribution to the development 
of international law. He claims, “. . . it would be wrong to regard these early 
instances as representing any serious contribution towards the evolution of the 
modern system of international law.”5 Without any disinclination, Stark 
appreciates only the contribution of European states for the development of 
international law.6 Further, Brierly also gives credit to the 1648 Westphalian 
system as the foundational stone in designing the character of the modern 
international law,7 which was in fact immediately shattered.8
However, Bandyopadhyay intensely questions how the European prerogative 
over international law, impregnated with imperialistic ideas, could be acceptable 
to the global community as the ideal prototype of modern international law; 
3. See L. OPPENHEIM, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ebook 23 (The Clarendon Press, 1921).
4. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, Kindle Location 726 (Lonang Institute, 
Kindle 2010 / 1625). Grotius maintains that, “It is sufficiently well established, therefore, that 
not all wars are at variance with the law of nature; and this may also be said to be true of the 
law of nations.”
5. See J. G. STARK, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (Butterworths, 1977).
6. Id.at 6. He claims that, “The modern system of international law is a product roughly 
speaking of only the last four hundred years. It grew to some extent out of the usages and 
practices of modern European states.”
7. See J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 
1-5 (The Clarendon Press, rep. 1989). Brierly mentions, “Rules which may be described as rules 
of international law are to be found in the history both of the ancient and medieval worlds; for 
ever since men began to organize their common life in political communities they have felt the 
need of some system of rules, however rudimentary, to regulate their inter-community relations. 
But as a definite branch of jurisprudence the system which we now know as international law is 
modern, dating only from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for its special character has 
been determined by that of the modern European state system, which was itself shaped in the 
ferment of the Renaissance and the Reformation.”
8. For detail discussion on the issue see generally DAVID ONNEKINK, WAR AND RELIGION AFTER 
WESTPHALIA 1648-1713 (Ashgate, 2009).
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among others, as it had denied the ‘right to self-determination,’ the foundation of 
sovereignty.9 Justice Owada contends that the Eurocentric explanation of 
international law grown on the basis of Christian theology was the hallmark of 
the expansionist policies of Europe.10 In fact, Montesquieu had already refuted the 
European claim over the European origination of international law. In ‘The Spirit 
of Laws,’ Montesquieu clearly mentions that, “The law of nations is naturally 
founded on this principle that different nations ought in time of peace to do one 
another all the good they can, and in time or war as little injury as possible . . . All 
countries have a law of nations, not excepting the Iroquois themselves, though 
they devour their prisoners; for they send and receive ambassadors, and 
understand the rights of war and peace . . .”11
R. P. Anand maintains the thesis that “. . . Asia was familiar with the 
language of international law from early times and that founding figures like 
Hugo Grotius borrowed from the doctrines and practices of Asian states.”12 
Fassbender and Peters succinctly expose how the history of international law has 
so far been written projecting Europe as the progenitor of international law, 
driven by the ideals of Enlightenment in the name of progress and humanity, 
which is seemingly beautiful but realistically false. They claim, “The Eurocentric 
story of international law has proven wrong because it is incomplete.”13 
Ambitiously and analytically, the Eurocentric explanation of international law 
hides the proper understanding of international law from its historical 
perspectives especially by committing errors in mirroring the images of the widely 
practiced doctrines of international law from across the globe. Thus, Keeton and 
Schwarzenberger contend that ‘viewed in isolation, international law is unlikely 
to reflect accurately the genesis of contemporary international law.’14 Glahn 
penetratingly shows that any examination of Assyrian, Babylonian, early Chinese, 
9. See PRAMATHANATH BANDYOPADHYAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM IN ANCIENT INDIA Ebook 1-3 
(Calcutta University Press, 1920).
10. See Hisashi Owada, Asia and International Law, 1 ASIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7, 
8-11 (2011).
11. See M. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 39 (The Library Fund Inc. 2010/1777).
12. Referred in B. S. Chimni, The World of TWAIL: Introduction to the Special Issue, 3 TRADE L. 
& DEV. 17, 14-25 (2011).
13. See Bardo Gassbender & Anne Peters, Introduction: Towards a Global History of 
International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Kindle 
Location 1398 (Bardo Gassbender & Anne Peters  eds., Oxford University Press, 2012).
14. See GEORGE W. KEETON & GEORGE SCHWANZENBENGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 
(Stevens & Sons, 1962).
Global Constitutionalism and the Constitutionalization of International Relations: A Reflection of Asian Approaches to International Law
（ 5 ） 5
Hebrew or Hindu records in the fields of warfare and diplomacy reveal many 
customs and usages which are still part of the practices of modern states.15
Especially in the post-colonial era, scholarship from outside the Western 
world is regaining its historical momentum by unearthing records and knowledge 
bases. For example, the work, Africa: Mapping New Boundaries in International 
Law, powerfully unfolds the fact that the credit for the world’s first constitutional 
government goes not to Europe but to Africa. Indeed, it also contends that the 
highly developed ancient African civilization of Egypt and Nubia, among others, 
had pioneered international rules relating to international trade, commerce, war, 
diplomacy, and treaty-making with the rigor of some conceptual affinity to modern 
international law.16 States in the ancient Indian continent had, two thousand 
years before Grotius, Rachel or Ayala recalled Europe to humanity, propounded a 
body of rules governing the sovereign states.17 In short, the Eurocentric 
explanation of international law can be understood anachronistic from both 
historical facts and scholastic traditions.18 In fact, Orakhelashvili argues that any 
assertions about the Eurocentric origin of international law “. . . are not only 
conceptually flawed, but are also unsupported by evidence. The origins of 
international law lie outside Europe, and at no stage of its development has 
international law been a truly European system.”19
In short, the Euro-centric claim over the prerogative on the origination of 
international law is indeed exceedingly gratuitous and fluid. Certainly, the 
understanding about the origin and development of international law would be 
more apposite to recognize if articulated not in spatial terms, but in terms of 
universal conceptual attribution, influence, continuity, and vivacity. The 
historically endured concept of constitutionalization of international rules in 
governing international relations thus gains its exuberance from having 
originated beyond any cultural and regional specific boundaries. Against this 
15. See Bardo Gassbender & Anne Peters, Introduction: Towards a Global History of 
International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Kindle 
Location 1398 (Bardo Gassbender & Anne Peters eds., Oxford University Press, 2012).
16. See generally Jeremy Levitt, Introduction - Africa: A Maker of International Law, in AFRICA: 
MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jeremy Levitt ed., Hart Publishing, 2008).
17. See BANDYOPADHYAY, supra note Ebook 6.
18. See Upendra Baxi, Some Remarks on Eurocentrism and the Law of Nations, in ASIAN STATES 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (in R. P. Anand ed., New Delhi, Vikas 
Publication, 1972).
19. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Idea of European International Law, 17 THE EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 315, 315-347 (2005).
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background, this paper explores the nature of the idea of constitutionalization of 
international relations and argues that any spatially fragmented explanation of 
international law is inadequate. However, at the same time it aims to examine the 
‘Asian Approach to International Law,’ in respect to Asian contribution to the 
development and institutionalization of international law, specifically the concept 
of constitutionalism. The following part of this paper will discuss the nature of the 
Asian approach to international law.
2. Is there any Uniform Asian Approach to International Law?
Besides some exceptions to multilateralism such as regionalism and 
bilateralism, any other forms of spatial fragmentations of international law are 
unassumingly elusive in their approaches. Having said that, some Asian scholars 
have reassuringly chosen the term ‘Asian Approaches to International Law,’20 
perhaps to be more reflexive of the Asian diversity. Also, other Asian scholars have 
contended the inappropriateness of any such description due to deep variations in 
the constitutive processes, structure, and facts of international law in Asia. For 
example, Chimni argues that, “Both essentialist/civilizational explanation and a 
crude materialist understanding of an Asian approach to international law need 
to be rejected.”21 Positively, the same standard could be applied to any other 
spatially fragmented approach to international law. At the same time, the growing 
Asian stimuli in changing the current structure of Western domination in the 
formulation and institutionalization of concepts into the framework of 
international law should be supportive of explicating international law from 
conceptual bulwark instead of engaging in any spatial fragmentations.22 The 
conspicuous roles played by Asia, Africa, and Latin America from the 
independence movement to making international rules through negotiations such 
as the Doha Round exemplify the changing dynamics, particularly in counter-
balancing the unilateral and dominant role of the West in constitutionalizing 
international relations. Unfortunately, in the real world, ‘hegemony invariably 
20. See generally Jin-Hyun Paik, Seok-Woo Lee, & Kevin Y. L. Tan eds., ASIAN APPROACHES TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LEGACY OF COLONIALISM (Routledge, 2012).
21. See B. S. Chimni, Is there an Asian Approach to International Law: Questions, Thesis, and 
Reflections, 14 ASIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (2008).
22. See generally SURENDRA BHANDARI, MAKING RULES IN THE WTO: FREE OR MANAGED TRADE 
(RoseDog Books, 2012); see also Zou Keyuan & Jianfu Chen, Introduction: The Rise of Asia, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EAST ASIA (Zou Keyuan & Jianfu Chen eds., International Law in East Asia, 
Ashgate, 2011).
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exercised in some degree by the dominant powers’ poses serious challenges to 
global constitutionalism.
The emergence of the constitutionalism of international law, especially in the 
post-war era, as the achievement of humankind is not European exclusively, nor it 
is typically American, Latin American, African, or Asian. It is rather fashioned by 
the common and universal aspirations of humankind. Nevertheless, the practical 
realm of designing concepts and transmuting them into the construct of 
international rules has overwhelmingly been Westernized, which is one of the 
reasons for the global disenchantment and backlash to the constitutionalism of 
international law or global constitutionalism. At the same time, academic 
disagreements about the global constitutionalism have also been preoccupied with 
the issues of descriptive and conceptual dissonances. Some of these objections 
about the departure of international rules from statist legacy to the regime of an 
emerging world society exceedingly suggest global constitutionalism as a cipher.23 
Despite objections, in recent days, works in the area of constitutionalization of 
international relations are growing immensely.24 However, one of the gaps 
discernible in the academic discourses persists on the basic demand for the 
conceptualization or operationalization of global constitutionalism.
23. See Lars Viellechner, Constitutionalism as a Cipher: On the Convergence of Constitutionalist 
and Pluralist Approaches to the Globalization of Law, 4 GOTTINGEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
600, 599-623 (2012).
24. See generally JAN KALBBERS, ANNE PETERS, & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press, 2009); see also Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman 
eds., Ruling the World Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); Karolina Milewicz, Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization: 
Toward a Conceptual Framework, 16 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 413-436 (2009); 
Nicholas Tsagourias ed., TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVES (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007).
Chart 1: Forms and Concept of Constitutionalism under International Law
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To address the gap, the chart above distinguishes constitutionalism under 
international law in its three forms and three conceptual features. Multilateral or 
global constitutionalism, regional constitutionalism, and bilateral framework are 
the three forms. In terms of conceptual features, bilateral framework is a weak 
one to be presented as constitutionalism in its strictest sense. Also, except the case 
of European Union, conceptually fulfilling regional constitutionalism is yet to be 
matured. Thus, out of these three forms, this paper mostly focuses only on the 
multilateral or global constitutionalism. The concept of global constitutionalism 
consists in its three fundamental features: legitimacy, authority, and validity. 
These three features also warrant a regime of global governance built upon the 
actual system of global constitutionalism. Also for analytical convenience, each of 
these three features consists of two important conceptual subsets (altogether six 
conceptual subsets). For example, sovereignty and consent ensure legitimacy. 
Harmony and enforceability constitute authority. Supremacy and positivity 
institutionalize validity.
This paper argues that modernity or modern international law is a reflection 
of global constitutionalism, which is not confined to any categories of temporal 
and spatial exclusions or explanations. Though, both temporal and spatial 
features help guarding concept in more specific context. Correspondingly, the 
framework of global constitutionalism is thus the foundational concept of 
international law, which distinguishes modernity from other appellations on the 
basis of six integral conceptual subsets: sovereignty, consent, harmonization, 
enforceability, positivity, and supremacy. With consent, sovereign states enter into 
and manage international relations by creating international laws. When 
sovereign states impart their consent through the process of ratification or 
accession (except for self-executing treaties), they are required to harmonize their 
domestic laws, policies, and administrative mechanisms compatible with 
international law. Moreover, the requirements of compatibility purport to make 
sure that international laws are faithfully enforced at the domestic level. If the 
member states or parties violate or do not implement international law, by 
exercising its supremacy over the domestic law, the international law requires 
member states to implement international law as validated by its positive 
foundation. In short, these six subset concepts provide necessary framework for 
the constitutionalization of international law and defining the modernity of 
international law. In absence of any of these six subset concepts, it is hard to 
conceive the constitutionalization of international law and secure its modernity. 
However, the answer to the question of what constitutes the modernity of 
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international law is often misunderstood, erroneously explained, and 
chauvinistically designed. For example, as discussed above, often the so-called 
claims about European origins and privileges over international law produce 
misunderstandings, erroneous explanations, and chauvinistic designs in regard to 
tracing Europe as the origination spot of modern international law. This space-
laden percept of modernity is not corroborated by any standard of conceptual 
analysis.
Sovereign equality as the basis of consent reinforces the appropriate process 
of the legitimacy of international rules as one of the foundational concepts of 
modern international law, which also existed in the ancient practices of 
international law in Asia. It is not strange, however, to find that much of the 
European literature on international law inaccurately exemplifies the Treaty of 
Westphalia, 1648, as the benchmark of the modern concept of sovereignty. Perhaps 
it is accurate in the context of Europe but it is not factual in the context of Asia 
and world at large. Moreover, modern commentators reject the Westphalian order, 
since it was primarily a non-constitutional order.25 Even in the nineteenth century, 
Brougham Leech had logically refuted any claims they would only produce 
illogical inference that no such science of international law had ever existed before 
the work of Grotius.26 Leech clearly projects that ancient civilizations had 
developed the science of law for the recognition and continuation of independent 
political communities and the role of consent in making international rules.27 The 
Asian practices of negotiations and the creation of treaties with consent in ancient 
civilizations were composed of the same ingredients of sovereignty and were 
drawn from the same awareness of legitimacy that we find in modern 
international law.28 However, these historical treasures capable of exemplifying 
the Asian approach to international law suffered attrition from being overlooked 
and distorted for centuries. Nevertheless, the ancient practices of negotiations and 
conclusion of treaties by the consent of sovereign states in Sumer, Assyria, Persia, 
India, China, Greece, Rome, and Islamic tradition provide ample evidence on the 
historical existence of the concept of legitimacy in the realm of international law. 29 
25. See JAN KALBBERS, ANNE PETERS, & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 8 (Oxford University Press, 2009).
26. See H. BROUGHAM LEECH, AN ESSAY ON ANCIENT INTERNATIONAL LAW, Kindle Location 47 
(Dublin, Printed at the University Press, Ponsonby and Murphy, 1877).
27. Id.
28. See generally id; see also R. P. ANAND, supra note.
29. See generally ADAM WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY pp. 21-134 (Routledge, 
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Against  this  background, this  paper  contends that  the  concept  o f 
constitutionalization of international law exists in Asia from ancient periods to 
the present day, excluding some exceptions like the traditional Chinese concept of 
vassal states.30
Harmonization of domestic laws, administrative mechanisms, and judicial 
practices, and enforcement of international law at the domestic level constitute 
major foundational stones of modern international law, which despite some 
deficiencies in institutional underpinning, also existed in the ancient Asian 
practices of international law. The lodestar of entering into treaties, from ancient 
periods to the present, is invariably the very idea of compliance. The concept of 
pacta sunt servanda and the sanctity of treaties applied in the regulations of 
inter-state conduct in ancient Asia show the existence of the notion of authority 
under international law.31 Furthermore, the recognition of the binding nature of a 
treaty by Kautilya further suggests the practical value and authority of treaties 
in managing inter-state relations.32 Though, to ensure the harmonization and 
enforceability of international law at the domestic level, international institutions 
and international courts existed like in the present day were certainly absent in 
those days. Nonetheless, the practices of arbitration and diplomatic missions in 
solving disputes between states were common in ancient Asian traditions.33
Transmutation of normative standards into a valid, legitimate, and 
enforceable regime warrants a positive order. A normative standard for achieving 
legitimacy through the accomplishment of a rule-making process commands 
authority in the form of institutionalized apparatus, further ensuring the 
implementation of the legitimized standards. However, the legitimate and 
authoritative standards may lack validity, which reminds us of the conditions of 
rule by law. On the contrary, the rule of law condition, where validity, legitimacy, 
and enforceability exist in a unified whole or harmony, constructs a positive order. 
The idea of positivism and the supremacy of constitutional order found both at the 
domestic and international levels present the unique achievements of modern 
Rep. 2010); see also BANDYOPADHYAYA supra note; COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME VOL. 1 & 2 (MacMillan and Co. Ltd, 1911); W. A. P. Martin, 
Traces of International Law in China, XIV THE INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 63-77 (1883).
30. See Zang Shiming, A Historical and Jurisprudential Analysis of Suzerain-Vassal State 
Relationship in the Quing Dynasty, 1 FRONT. HIST. CHINA 124-157 (2006).
31. See generally R. P. ANAND, supra note at 31-36.
32. Id., at 34-36.
33. Id.
Global Constitutionalism and the Constitutionalization of International Relations: A Reflection of Asian Approaches to International Law
（ 11 ） 11
legal systems, which were also envisioned in ancient Asian legal political 
practices. For example, law, justice, and governance were closely interlinked in 
Buddha’s concept of social political systems. Buddha considered law as the 
instrument, which grafts the system of reward and punishment with the idea of 
righteousness.34 Buddha’s reverence to law was extraordinary. He considered that 
the follower of law would possess true knowledge and serenity of mind.35 
Dhammapada, a collection of verses being one of the canonical books of Buddhism, 
claims that, “If an earnest person has roused himself, if he is not forgetful, if his 
deeds are pure, if he acts with consideration, if he restrains himself, and lives 
according to law, then his glory will increase.”36 For Buddha, law was not a divine 
order but a positive order created through human virtue for the promotion of 
universal humanity. His idea of human virtue was not suitable only to a domestic 
order, but also applicable to the international order as well.
The idea of virtue commonly found in the philosophical traditions of Buddha, 
Confucius, Socrates, and Plato among others explain the validity of an 
international system. Like Buddha, Confucius also saw both virtue and ethics as 
standards, which could transform the individual and social life into peace, 
harmony, and justice both at the local and inter-state levels. Confucius saw social 
order in the form of a justified duty that would lead to the welfare of an 
individual, state, and international community. Confucius maintained that, “He 
who entertains thoughts contrary to justice will act contrary to reason.”37 Justice 
was the standard of governance for Confucius.38 The Confucian system of justice 
embodies two important ideas: reason and the ‘right thing to do.’39 The Chinese 
word zhengyi is the counterpart of the English word ‘justice’. Zheng means setting 
things right and rectifying things, and yi means righteousness, truth, fitness, or 
the right principle. Thus, the term zhengyi connotes setting things right and 
34. See CHARLES ELIOT, HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM: AN HISTORICAL SKETCH Ch. X, EBook 582 (London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., Vol. 1, Reprint 1962/1921).
35. See F. Max Muller trans., THE DHAMMAPADA Ch. 1, verse 20 (EBook, The Project Gutenberg, 
2008). Verse 34 provides that, “If a man’s thoughts are unsteady, if he does not know the true law, 
if his peace of mind is troubled, his knowledge will never be perfect.”
36. See id., verse 24.
37. See ROBERT K. DOUGLAS, CONFUCIANISM AND TAOUISM, Ebook 371 (London, Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge, 1879).
38. See id., at 171.
39. In recent days, the concept of a ‘right thing to do’ has been made popular by Michael Sandel 
by interpreting justice as a concept of right thing to do. See generally  MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM 
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 1998).
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allowing righteousness to stand straight.40 The Buddhist and Confucian ideas 
about law suggest the importance of legitimacy, authority and validity applicable 
both at the domestic and international levels.
In short, in the absence of legitimacy, authority, and validity, international 
law loses its foundation of existence, operation, and universality. The Asian 
approach to international law, in an inclusive style, symbolizes the idea of 
constitutionalism both in its ancient contributions, and the post-war contributions 
to international law. The early Asian thoughts and practices, especially from the 
ancient Indian sub-continent and China, have played an important role in 
diffusing the concept of constitutionalizing international relations. In the post-war 
era, l ike other continents, Asia is also underwriting the concept of 
constitutionalization manifested further in global, and plural discourses (regional 
and bilateral) of international law. As the global constitutionalism outlines the 
modern character of international law, the European initiatives before the 
establishment of the United Nations merely provided conflicting and parochial 
conceptual references to the idea of constitutionalism, especially because of three 
factors. First, under the system of colonization, the system of constitutionalism 
under international law could not exist both conceptually and practically. Further, 
colonialism ruthlessly shattered the universal cause of humanity. Second, as a 
product of a gun-powered civilization, the system of just war legitimized in the 
pre-UN European age had disgracefully divided the whole world into civilized, 
high-civilizations, and primitive arrangements. For European colonizers, Europe 
(broadly the West) was the only civilized world. For them, China, India, and Japan 
were not civilized but were high-civilized countries, and the rest of the world was 
primitive and thus not civilized.41 This incoherent and offensive European 
understanding of civilization and international law was the actual foe of the 
concept of constitutionalism under international law. Third, the idea of 
constitutionalization of international relations has specifically been entrenched by 
the UN Charter. Thus, modern international law and its features of 
constitutionalism conclusively begin only with the institutionalization of the UN 
Charter, which is not a sole product of Europe or any other particular regime.
Nevertheless, due to the power and interest led mechanism of the veto system 
under the UN Security Council; time and again the powerful countries have 
chipped away at the constitutionalism of international law, which has been 
40. See Xunwu Chen, Justice: The Neglected Argument and the Pregnant Vision, 19 ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 
191, 189-198 (2009).
41. See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, pp. 8-10 (Duke University Press, 2004).
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discussed in the following passages. In this context, a more unpretentious system 
of constitutionalism under international law can be found in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
among others. Nevertheless, the WTO system of the constitutionalism also suffers 
from a number of conceptual biases.42 Though, more succinctly, it reflects the 
features of constitutionalism compared to many other regimes of international 
law. Against this background, the Asian Approach to international law is analyzed 
in reference to constitutionalism under the UN including the human rights 
conventions, ICC, and the WTO systems.
Although academic underpinnings in the area of the ‘Asian Approach to 
International Law’ is significantly growing in recent times, including the ‘Third 
World Approach to International Law’ (TWAIL), the distinctive features of the 
‘approach,’ in particular an ‘Asian approach’ to international law, demands more 
specific and clear methodological structure and understanding. As suggested in 
the chart below, this paper appreciates the ‘Asian approach’ in seven different 
features as a frame of reference to analyze the system as an integrated structure.
42. See BHANDARI, supra note.
Chart 2: Basic Features of the Asian Approach
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At the conceptual level, the case of an Asian Approach to international law 
refers to a number of ideas. The seven ideas listed in Chart II, are in no case 
exhaustive. It is also because Asia as a region with vast cultural, civilizational, 
and philosophical diversities might not be confined to any specific structures. 
However, the concept of constitutionalism as the building block of international 
law allows appreciating the ‘Asian approach ’ in these seven different 
methodological frameworks for analytical convenience and conceptual clarity.
The seven features of the ‘Asian approach’ to international law consist in the 
diffusion of concepts, a uniform identity, collective interests, uniform norms and 
facts, the existence of similar institutions, common processes, and uniformity in 
outcomes. As the home of multiple religions, civilizations, cultures, and political 
ideologies, in common, Asia often lacks these features on social, political, economic, 
cultural, and legal domains, which are also reflexive to the issue of international 
law. Against this background, as claimed by Chimni, it would be comfortable to 
reject the idea of the ‘Asian approach’ to international law. But at the conceptual 
level, especially on the count of diffusion of concepts, Asia is historically hospitable 
to universal, and pluralist concepts of international law, which is especially 
germane to the concept of constitutionalizing international relations.
In the post-Cold War era, as we are experiencing the growing role of 
international law in shaping the process and outcomes of the globalized world with 
the idea of constitutionalism, the role of Asia cannot be viewed outside of the 
framework of the constitutionalization process. Thus, in the following sections, this 
paper analyzes the Asian approach to international law within the framework of 
constitutionalism. Understandably, today’s world governs international relations 
not only by the standards of diplomacy, but also largely by the standards of 
international rules, which institutionalize the foundation of global governance. With 
the heightened role of international law in the legitimization and regulation of 
international relations through the vantage point of the global constitutionalism, 
the Asian approach coexists mainly as the part of the following four processes:
•   Constitutionalization of International Institutional Order or Global 
Governance,
•  Constitutionalization of International Relations: From Diplomacy to Law,
•   International Relations: Harmonization of Domestic Rules and Practices, 
and
•  Global Constitutionalism.
Each of these processes is discussed below under separate headings.
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3.  Constitutionalization of International Institutional Order or 
Global Governance
A spectacular rise of international institutional order comprehended in the 
post-war era appears confident in espousing the system of global governance. 
Certainly, Asia is a part of global governance. Global governance is progressively 
getting deeper with the constitutionalization of international relations. Pascale 
Lamy vividly outlines the basic features of global governance. He links governance 
systems on national, regional and international levels as three states of mass: 
solid, liquid, and gaseous. He argues a governance deficit arises when citizens are 
left behind in participating in all these forms of governance. He offers four 
fundamental principles of global governance: the rule of law, subsidiarity, 
coherence, and integration. He clearly puts forward the idea that global 
governance must be anchored in the system of the rule of law that enforces 
international commitments. Governance decisions should be taken on the basis of 
the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. taking decisions at the level at which it would be 
most effective to do so. The principle of coherence demands States to act in unison 
to give effect to their commitments. The principle of integration demands States 
to integrate international rules at the domestic level allowing citizens to become 
the part of this process and be a beneficiary of the outcome.43
Our Global Neighborhood Report, 1995, succinctly highlights the role of global 
governance in terms of interconnectedness driven by rules-based international 
relations. In the age of globalization, it also foresees the greater role for the power 
of people in shaping their future collectively. The establishment and 
institutionalization of the United Nations system draws on the universal hope for 
a new era in international relations. However, the onset of the Cold War had 
greatly diminished the fulfillment of this universal hope. With the end of the Cold 
War, the prospect for pursuing common objectives through multilateralism has 
turned out to be a high possibility. The world community seems to be uniting 
around the idea of collective responsibility in a wide range of areas, including not 
only with security in a military sense, but also in economic and social terms for 
sustainable development, the promotion of democracy, equity, human rights, and 
humanitarian solidarity. In this changed context, there is no alternative to 
working together using the concept of the rule of law as the instrument of 
43. See WTO, Receiving Honorary Doctorate in Turkey, Lamy Warns against Remote Global 
Governance, (March 15, 2013), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl272_e.htm.
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collective power to create a better world, the Report claims.44 Nevertheless, 
Professor Kimijima argues that the problem of ensuring the rule of law as the 
governing standard for the UN Security Council members, especially for the five 
permanent members, poses a grave challenge in the realization of the rules based 
international relations and global governance.45 The NATO intervention in Bosnia, 
the US intervention in Iraq, the US presence in Afghanistan, and the politics in 
the Security Council in regard to stopping the grave violations of human rights in 
Syria corroborate the suspicions of Professor Kimijima.
3.1 Constitutionalization of Globalization
The development of constitutionalism under international law has brought 
globalization within its legalistic premise. ‘Globalization’46 is not a new idea. 
Though, ‘global constitutionalism’47 has been understood and explained from 
diverse perspectives. Nevertheless, the scope, and implications of global 
constitutionalism have become more penetrating with the growing prominence of 
the concept of global governance and globalization. Accordingly, globalization has 
become one of the most hotly debated issues, almost everywhere in the world. In 
recent years perhaps the debate has procured more proponents, as well as 
opponents, than any other international issue. Also, there has been no dearth of 
literature on globalization both from the proponents and opponents viewpoints. 
Similarly, in one way or another, every discipline is engaged in explaining and 
conceptualizing globalization. This paper neither intends to survey the literature 
on globalization, nor engages in reviewing the interdisciplinary conceptualization 
of globalization. Broadly, it subscribes to the idea of interconnectedness, which 
seems suffusing into all disciplines in conceptualizing globalization and the 
progression of Asia towards reaping the benefits by addressing the plausible 
44. See Our Global Neighborhood: Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Chapter 1 
(Oxford University Press, 1995).
45. See Akihiko Kimijima, Japan’s Contribution to Global Constitutionalism 4 SOCIETIES 
WITHOUT BORDERS 105-116 (2009).
46. See PRIEST TYLER, THE HISTORY OF GLOBALIZATION (Kendall Hunt Publishing, 2012); see also 
JURGEN OSTERHAMMEL & NIELS P. PETERSSON, GLOBALIZATION: A SHORT HISTORY (in Dona Gyer trans., 
Princeton University Press, 2009); ALEXANDER MC GILLIVARY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF GLOBALIZATION: 
THE UNTOLD STORY OF OUR INCREDIBLE SHRINKING PLANET (Robinson Publishing, 2006).
47. See generally CHRISTINE E. J. SCHWOBEL, GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011); see also Kimijima, supra note; Andreas L. Paulus, The 
International Legal System as a Constitution, in RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 69 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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challenges. In this new environment, as projected by the Asian Development 
Bank, with its most successful trend of economic growth and human development, 
Asia might regain its historical strength with 51 percent of global GDP by 2050.48
The institutionalization of global constitutionalism as a positive framework 
could be comprehensively appraised with the appreciation of the normative 
aspects of globalization as well. As shown below in the chart III, this paper divides 
globalization into two categories: positive and normative. On the positive level, 
international rules facilitate and govern international relations with the 
institutionalized nature of global governance founded on uniform standards, 
harmonization of domestic rules, and the supremacy of international rules in the 
framework of global constitutionalism. The global constitutionalism entrenched in 
legitimacy, authority, and validity in all stages of law creation, implementation, 
and adjudication can be termed as legalism. Against this background, the 
following chart will help to estimate the concept of globalization.
The distinction of the normative side of globalization could be better understood 
in terms of processes, outcomes, and implications of interconnectedness of 
individuals, communities, companies, institutions, and governments, among others. 
For example, Alaina Podmorow, a nine year old, 4th grade Canadian student, after 
attending a lecture by a journalist decided to help and raise funds for the education 
of the poor, discriminated, and neglected women in Afghanistan. Alaina started an 
48. See ADB, Asia in 2050: Realizing the Asian Century, 2011.
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organization called Little Women for Little Women in Afghanistan.49 A 68-year old 
former local government employee of Japan, Mr. Yujiro Ishimaru is constructing 
school buildings in remote areas of Nepal to provide educational opportunities to 
poor children. He has already constructed 40 schools and is planning to construct 60 
more schools, in memory of his daughter. Already, more than 13,000 students have 
benefited from Ishimaru’s philanthropy.50 Perhaps, these normative initiatives at 
the individual level stand out as the succinct examples of interconnectedness for a 
global cause. These normative initiatives could never be realized unless there would 
exist a supportive system governed by international and domestic rules.
As a part of civil society engagement, INGOs and NGOs are serving from one 
corner of the world to the other for the development and well-being of 
communities. When poverty, disease, or natural disasters hit communities hard; 
the global community promptly shows its solidarity offering unselfish support. 
Whether it is the Fukushima disaster or devastations from earthquakes in Chile 
or Solomon Islands, no matter where they are, the international community is not 
silent. Instead, it acts with a deep sense of morality and responsibility at the 
normative level. Communities are not only interested in knowing what is 
happening only in their own communities, but they are equally keen to know what 
is happening elsewhere around the globe. Outstandingly, they stand up for the 
cause of global justice and welfare. Flagrant violations of human rights in one 
part of the world are not concerns only for that part of the world, but they 
instantly become issues of global concern. Whether it is the case of the gang rape 
of a young girl on a bus in India,51 or other cases of human rights violations in 
Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, China, or Nepal, the global community is disposed to 
denounce and resist injustice not only suffered by them, but also suffered by 
human beings across the globe. Straightforwardly and instantaneously, public 
49. For detail information, please visit: http://www.littlewomenforlittlewomen.com .
50. See Japan Times, Benefactor Builds Schools in Nepal, (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/01/17/national/benefactor-builds-schools-in-nepal/#.
USxErqUyHdk .
51. A 23-year-old medical student was victim of an hours-long gang rape on a bus in New Delhi 
on Dec. 16, 2012. Six men raped the girl, damaged her organs and body with iron rods on a bus 
while driving around the city before stripping and dumping her on the side of the road. The girl 
passed away, while undergoing treatment in Singapore. This instant of cruelty sparked public 
outrage not only in India, but also across the globe. For detail information visit on http://www.
indianexpress.com/fullcoverage/delhi-gangrape/467 ; http://www.breakingnews.com/topic/new-
delhi-gang-rape-case ; http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/south-africa-girl-dies-after-rape-
comparison-made-to-indian-case-327511; http://indiatoday.intoday.in/section/240/1/delhi-gangrape.
html .
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opinions cross the artificial boundaries of communities and countries. Amazingly, 
communities are interconnected more responsively than ever before. However, 
both international and domestic laws play catalytic role in transmuting the 
normative activities by legitimizing them into positive rules. In fact, the positive 
rules may either foster or retard the normative activities of interconnectedness.
When there were few routes of trade, such as the Silk Road, Chinese silk 
would take more than eighteen months to reach Rome.52 Except the Emperor and 
a few rich people, hardly any consumers could even think of buying silk. Today, 
goods produced in any part of the world can easily, quickly, and inexpensively 
travel across borders. Consumers worldwide have abundant choices of what to buy 
and consume. In many cases, companies launch their products in different parts of 
the world at the same time so that the consumers can have access to their 
products straightaway. The age of consumption requirements on local or national 
products has almost become a bygone case. Largely, the process of trade 
liberalization ushered by the WTO, which seems to further deepen in the future, 
has unleashed today’s markets globally. Markets, producers, and consumers all 
are interconnected globally, as if they are inseparable. However, the 
interconnectedness could hardly be flourished in the absence of facilitating 
environment created by international law. This premise leads to conceive law as 
the designer of globalization or it can be termed as the constitutionalization of 
globalization.
3.2 International Law as the Designer of Globalization
Not only individuals and businesses, but also institutions and governments 
52. See WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: HOW TRADE SHAPED THE WORLD, Kindle 
Location 138-148, (Perseus Books Group, Kindle Edition, 2009). “How did goods get from China 
to Rome? Very slowly and very perilously, one laborious stage at a time. Chinese traders from 
southern ports loaded their ships with silk for the long coastwise journey down Indochina and 
around the Malay Peninsula and Bay of Bengal to the ports of Sri Lanka. There, they would be 
met by Indian merchants who would then transport the fabric to the Tamil ports on the 
southwest coast of the subcontinent̶Muziris, Nelcynda, and Comara. Here, large numbers of 
Greek and Arab intermediaries handled the onward leg to the island of Dioscordia (modern 
Socotra), a bubbling masala of Arab, Greek, Indian, Persian, and Ethiopian entrepreneurs. From 
Dioscordia, the cargo floated on Greek vessels through the entrance of the Red Sea at the Bab el 
Mandeb (Arabic for “Gate of Sorrows”) to the sea’s main port of Berenice in Egypt; then across 
the desert by camel to the Nile; and next by ship downstream to Alexandria, where Greek 
Roman and Italian Roman ships moved it across the Mediterranean to the huge Roman termini 
of Puteoli (modern Pozzuoli) and Ostia. As a general rule, the Chinese seldom ventured west of 
Sri Lanka, the Indians north of the Red Sea mouth, and the Italians south of Alexandria. It was 
left to the Greeks, who ranged freely from India to Italy, to carry the greatest share of the 
traffic.”
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are interconnected. International institutions decide what rate of customs duty 
governments should levy on goods and services imported and exported. The levels 
of protection to be offered to the owner of intellectual property rights are also 
decided at the international level. At the international level, governments also 
settle what environmental standards the producers should maintain in producing 
goods and services. Not only trade and environmental issues are decided at the 
international level, but also the issues of human rights, security, peace, and 
development are discussed, negotiated, and decided. No government can claim 
that human rights abuses fall exclusively into its domestic affairs immune from 
any international introspection and monitoring. No government can claim the 
sovereign right over harboring terrorists and violators of international criminal 
law. No government can insist on its sovereign integrity or domestic laws as an 
excuse for defaulting on the decisions of international judicial organs such as the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and International Criminal Court (ICC), among others. This 
said, for Asian legal traditions, the Medellin case decided by the US Supreme 
Court in 2008, which found the decision of the ICJ not binding unless Congress 
enacts an implementing law appears as an uncomfortable legal concept. This is 
because Asia has barely defied the authority of the ICJ or the WTO ever since 
their establishment. In particular, the development of global constitutionalism, 
besides some exceptions in regards to Iraq, Myanmar, and North Korea, Asia 
adopted a way for coexistence in a global society by promoting the idea of global 
governance that vanguards the supremacy of international laws over domestic 
laws and policies.
The idea of interconnectedness can be understood with different levels and 
forms. Moral, social, economic, cultural, and political or other arrangements are 
some of the expressions of the forms of interconnectedness. Along with these 
several arrangements, interconnectedness could also be split into at least two 
further levels: binding (i.e. legalistic or positive) and non-binding (e g. networking 
or normative) arrangements or regimes. From the above discussion it can be 
deduced that the global interconnectedness has been culminated into the rules-
based system of global constitutionalism and governance. From a regime 
perspective, globalization could be better called a binding regime. The very idea of 
a binding regime expressed through the concept of constitutionalism and 
governance constitutes the subject matter of law, international relations, and 
globalization. In this respect, law functions either as a tool or a master of 
globalization. As a master, law designs the process, defines the nature, and shapes 
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the progression and direction of globalization. Indeed, globalization has elegantly 
cultivated the idea of law as a ruler.
A few decades ago, Woodrow Wilson observed that, “You will see that 
international law is revolutionized by putting morals into it.”53 This is especially 
more true in the field of international relations than in any other field, since 
international relations are not simply governed by moral standards reflected in 
domestic theories, policies, and diplomacy, but are overwhelmingly managed by 
rules-based international standards. In this regard, it is obvious that concepts of 
internationalization of standards and globalization of standards conspicuously 
influence the nature of international relations. Peter Singer vividly distinguishes 
the concepts of internationalization and globalization. He attributes 
internationalization to the old mode of international relations under which the 
conception of a nation-state or the traditional idea of sovereignty is not only 
recognized, but also given a determining status. Beyond the traditional idea of 
sovereignty, Singer deliberates globalization as a form of standard, which requires 
the conceptual transformation of sovereignty into a new form, with the recognition 
of the supremacy of international rules for the governance of international 
relations.54
Our Global Neighborhood Report powerfully observes that, “The rule of law 
has been a critical civilizing influence in every free society. It distinguishes a 
democratic from a tyrannical society; it secures liberty and justice against 
repression; it elevates equality above dominion; it empowers the weak against the 
unjust claims of the strong. Its restraints, no less than the moral precepts it 
asserts, are essential to the well-being of a society, both collectively and to 
individuals within it. Respect for the rule of law is thus a basic neighborhood 
value. And one that is certainly needed in the emerging global neighborhood.”55
As a medium of the formal expression of interdependence and cooperation 
among nations, international law has uniquely been assuming the role of a 
designer of the process of international relations and globalization, especially with 
the growing recognition of the supremacy of international rules over domestic 
rules. The changing socio-economic and political relations at the global level, 
53. Cited in Sir Arthur Watts KCMG QC, The Importance of International Law in THE ROLE OF 
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 
(Michael Byers ed., Oxford University Press, reprinted 2009).
54. See generally PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION (Yale University Press, 
2002, Kindle edition).
55. See supra note Our Global Neighborhood, Chapter 6.
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inspired by the idea of a rules-based international system, have instilled the 
nature of international relations beyond the preoccupied limits of diplomacy. At 
the same time, the dynamics of globalization have also penetratingly necessitated 
the adjustments of legal concepts along with the pace of socio-economic and 
political transformations.56 In this process, law itself has been globalized. 
Similarly, laws of Asian countries have been globalized in the sense of 
harmonizing international rules at the domestic level, and instilling the 
supremacy of international rules over domestic laws and practices. In this new 
environment, the Asian legal culture has been deepen further in strengthening 
constitutionalization of international relations as a bedrock for the most efficient 
way of coexistence, security, and progress, which can also be termed as the 
reflection of global welfare.
4.  Constitutionalization of International Relations: 
From Diplomacy to Law
Whether it is Kautliya’s economics57 or Greek philosophical writings,58 there 
is common evidence of the role of diplomacy in managing socio-cultural, political, 
and economic relations among states, especially between neighboring states in the 
early days of political history. In today’s world, it is not only neighboring states 
that matter. Non-state actors from remote parts of the world also matter for both 
good and bad. For example, Alaina Podmorow, a nine-year-old Canadian girl (16 
years old in 2013) could initiate solidarity for the education of deprived women in 
Afghanistan. At the same time, a terrorist group, Al Qaida, working from the 
remote hills of Afghanistan could create unprecedented cruelty and a devastating 
massacre of innocent people with their actions in September 2001. The point is 
that international relations are more connected than ever before. States cannot 
operate by remaining in isolation. They cannot avoid engaging with each other for 
better relations, cooperation, coexistence, and solidarity for addressing common 
problems and enlarging opportunities both at normative and positive levels. The 
name of this engagement, in other words this paper terms, as a movement from 
56. See SURENDRA BHANDARI, COURT-CONSTITUTION & GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY: A STUDY ON THE NEPALESE 
PERSPECTIVE, pp.208-216 (Democracy Development and Law, Kathmandu, 1999).
57. See KAUTILYA’S ARTHASASTHRA (R. Shamasastry trans., Spastic Cat Press, 2009).
58. Euphernus, quoting Thucydides stated that in the case of a king or imperial city nothing was 
unjust, which was expedient. Referred in HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE [DE JURE BELLI 
AC PACIS] Kindle Location 90 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Lonang Institute, 2010).
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diplomacy to law.
Willingly or unwillingly, a state is bound to look outside its borders in order to 
understand and protect itself. It cannot remain disinterested and disengaged in 
things that happen around the world. What is more, to some extent every state is 
conditioned to the activities of not only other states but also non-state actors 
across the globe. Once Jean-Jacques Rousseau expressed that when a group of 
states forms a closely knit system, the involvement of many self-willed political 
actors imposes upon each state a continuous awareness that the others have 
interests and purposes distinct from its own, and that the things other states do 
or may do limit and partly determine its own policies.59
Diplomacy expressed in the form and essence of managing good relationships, 
promoting cooperation and opportunities, building solidarity by addressing 
common problems, and protecting local and global interests through dialogues, 
negotiations, and engagements among countries has always remained at the core 
of international relations but often resulted in the benefit of the powerful. 
Bederman informs us that around 2100 BC a solemn treaty was concluded 
between Lahash and Umma in Mesopotamia, largely corresponding to modern-
day Iraq, northeastern Syria, southeastern Turkey, and southeastern Iran, 
defining boundaries of the neighboring countries. The treaty was inscribed in 
stone. Nussbaum apprises that around 1100 BC, Egypt and Hitties had concluded 
a treaty for peace, brotherhood, and a defensive alliance.60 Since then, countless 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral treaties have been concluded across the world 
to regulate international relations. Whether it is the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia;61 
the 1919 Treaty of Versailles;62 the Charter of the United Nations, 1945;63 or the 
WTO Agreement, 1994;64 or other numerous multilateral, regional and bilateral 
59. Cited in ADAM WATSON, DIPLOMACY Kindle Locations 293-296 (Taylor & Francis, Reprint ed., 
2007).
60. Referred in MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed., 
2008).
61. See Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their 
respective Allies, done at Munster in Westphalia, the 24th Day of October 1648.
62. See The Versailles Treaty of June 28, 1919, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/
parti.asp .
63. See Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, signed 
on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945, available at http://www.
un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml.
64. See the WTO Agreement, 1994 which includes General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
1994 (GATT); General Agreement on Trade in Services, 1994 (GATS); General Agreement on 
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treaties; there seems to be a conspicuous trend of diplomatic initiatives of 
consultations, dialogues, and negotiations often resulting into a positive 
framework of law. In this context, Steve Smith observes that this positive 
framework of law or positivism has been largely accountable for both the 
character and content of international theory in recent days.65
Traditionally, the concept that ‘war begins when diplomacy fails’ had 
dominated the regime of international relations. With this concept, diplomacy was 
centrally integrated into the prescient and periphery of war: to develop alliances, 
secure territory and people, expand territory through war, enter into peaceful 
arrangements, and so on. Among these traditional features, expanding territory 
through war has now been declared illegal66 and has been contained to a larger 
extent in the present day. No matter, whether it was in the era of Kautliya’s 
realism,67 Sun Tzu’s Art of War,68 Chinggis (Genghis) Khan’s mastery of war,69 the 
Treaty of Westphalia, 1648;70 or the First and Second World Wars; all have ended 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994 (TRIPS); Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 1994 (DSB); Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism, 1994 (TPRM); and Plurilateral Trade Agreements, 1994 (PTAs); available at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm .
65. See Steve Smith, Positivism and Beyond, in INTERNATIONAL THEORY: POSITIVISM AND BEYOND 
11 (Steve Smith, Ken Booth, & Marysia Lalewski eds., Cambridge University Press, 1996).
66. See Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, which provides that, “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United 
Nations.”
67. Kautilya’s discussion of war and diplomacy are fascinating and far-reaching. He wished his 
King to become a world conqueror. He understood states as natural allies and inevitable enemies. 
He perceived treaties as instruments of serving interests and power and to be broken if they do 
not serve the interests. Truly, Kautilya was truly ancient founder of realism. For detail 
discussion, see Roger Boesche, Kautilya’s Arthasastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India, 
67 JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY 9-37 (2003).
68. See generally SUN TSU, THE ART OF WAR (Ralph D. Sawyer trans., Basic Books, 1994). The 
main idea of the book can be summarized as: He who relies solely on warlike measures shall be 
exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful measures shall perish. If you know the enemy and 
know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the 
enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
69. See JEREMY BLACK, A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY, Kindle Location 96 (Reaktion Books, 2010). In 
the thirteenth century, Chinggis Khan had sent an envoy to the Governor of Otran, even after 
the Governor had massacred a caravan of Mongols. Chinggis Khan still wanted to trade and 
settle the dispute without war. But when his envoy was also executed, his control of repose and 
tranquility was removed and could be quenched only by the shedding of blood.
70. See supra note 62. The Treaty of Westphalia is considered one of the legitimate sources of 
transforming international relations into the domain of positivism. It championed the idea of 
rules-based governance of international relations based on the idea of sovereignty. Shaw claims 
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up with a transformation of international relations into a positivist direction, i.e. 
rules-based governance of international relations. In today ’s world, the 
instruments of international treaties manage most international relations issues. 
Nevertheless, the role for diplomacy in the creation of international rules, and 
maintaining confidence of coexistence between governments is unwaveringly 
important. Obviously, diplomacy pursued beyond the boundary of law (domestic 
and international) loses its legitimacy and validity. Diplomatic activities cannot 
ignore or violate law. In this sense, modern diplomacy is disciplined within the 
purview of the rule of law, which succinctly conveys the connection between law 
and diplomacy.
However, some international political science scholars, especially from the 
West, have contested the connection between law and diplomacy. They have 
maintained that international law and international organizations that 
administer international laws are essentially irrelevant to a proper understanding 
of international politics and consequently progressive development of 
international political theory.71 Stanley Hoffman in 1971 concluded that the 
irrelevance of international law and organizations would persist until the world 
returned to the conditions of relatively simple placidity that supposedly 
characterized its formative period.72 Boyle adds, in other words, international law 
and international organizations would not become relevant to international 
politics in the foreseeable or even distant future.73 Further, Boyle argues that the 
application of legal methods to address the international political problems is 
thoroughly inadequate and also counterproductive.74 Leading authorities such as 
E. H. Carr & Hans J. Morgenthau had also rejected the significance of 
international law in the realm of international relations. These realists had 
argued that, when it comes to the crunch, international law does not have impact 
that positivism developed as the modern nation-state system emerged, after the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, from the religious wars in Europe. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
26 (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed., 2008). See also, S. Beaulac, The Westphalian Legal 
Orthodoxy–Myth or Reality? 2 JOURNAL OF HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 148-177 (2000); C. 
Harding & C. L. Lim eds., RENEGOTIATING WESTPHALIA (Martinus Nijhoff, 1999); L. Gross, The 
Peace of Westphalia1648-1948, 42 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-41 (1948).
71. See FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Duke University Press, 
1995).
72. Referred in id., at 4.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id., at 5-6.
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on state behaviors.75 Besides some exceptions, such as the recurrent reluctance to 
govern international relations based on the principle of constitutionalization 
among some South Asian countries, traditional sense of rivalries between regional 
powers, and some democratic deficiencies; on the whole, Asia in the post-war era, 
especially in the post-Cold War era, seems to have been constructively engaged in 
promoting international relations on the foundation of international rules and 
global constitutionalism.76
Armstrong, Farrell, and Lambart claim that the argument that international 
law has had no impact on contemporary world politics and that states can do as 
they please is hard to credit.77 Basac Cali considers observations that ignore the 
role of international law in international relations as cynical expressions. He 
suggests that the cynics regard international law as an enterprise of the naïve, 
the occupation of wishful thinkers, or the realm of the fools who do not understand 
international politics. Cali argues that the cynical view is incorrect.78
What the events and evidence demonstrate is that the perspective 
disintegrating the connection between international law and international 
relations is either exaggerated or speculative. For example, there are numerous 
areas of international relations, some of them can be stated as: war, weapons, use 
of force, peace, security, human rights, trade, business, investment, intellectual 
property rights, environment, conservation of natural resources, sustainable 
development, use of the sea, air and space, international crime, and the exchange 
and protection of diplomats. All these major areas of international relations are 
now governed by international laws. But the question arises of whether 
international law is effective in governing the behaviors of powerful states or not. 
With some examples of the use of force, let us examine the issues of connection 
between international relations and international law in conjunction with the 
perspective of the effectiveness of international law.
75. Referred in DAVID ARMSTRONG, THEO FARRELL, & HELENE LAMBERT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Kindle Location 110 (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2012).
76. For detail discussion see ROBERT A. DAYLEY, & CLARK D. NEHER, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ERA (Westview Press, 2013); see also AMITAV ACHARYA, THE MAKING OF SOUTHEAST 
ASIA; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF A REGION (Cornell University Press, 2013); Michael J. Green, & 
Bates Gill, ASIA'S NEW MULTILATERALISM: COOPERATION, COMPETITION, AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 
(Columbia University Press, 2008); DAVID SHAMBAUGH, & MICHAEL YAHUDA, INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS OF ASIA: ASIA IN WORLD POLITICS (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008)
77. Id., Kindle Location 123.
78. See BASAC CALI, INTERNATIONAL LAW OR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2 (Oxford University Press, 
2010).
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Until the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945,79 the use of force was not 
prohibited in a legal sense. Article 2.4 of the UN Charter clearly prohibits the use 
of force in conducting international relations. Article 51 allows the use of force in 
the form of self-defense until the Security Council takes appropriate measures 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Any state using force for self-defense should 
immediately inform the Security Council and receive permission from the Security 
Council for further action. Until the Security Council takes any decision, the force 
used in self-defense should not exceed the limit of necessity and proportionality.80
A number of treaties had imposed a system of self-restraint,81 but had not 
prohibited the use of force in the conduct of international relations before the 
establishment of the UN. The system of the League of Nations,82 influenced by the 
Westphalia Treaty, 1648, had failed to outlaw war and the use of force. In one or 
79. For example Article 2.4 of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force. It provides that, “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purpose of the United Nations.” Article 51 allows using force only for self-defense, until 
the Security Council takes necessary measures.
80. See Nicaragua v. United States (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua), 
I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392. In this case the ICJ has established that the prohibition on the use of force 
constitutes a jus cogens norm of international law, specified in Article 2.4 of the UN Charter. However, 
right to self-defense is one of the exceptions to the rule of jus cogens. Nevertheless, the exception should 
only be used within the purview of limitations established in the Caroline incident: the use of force in 
self-defense should not exceed the limit of necessity and proportionality.
81. For example, The Covenant of the League of Nations (Covenant), 1919; and The Kellogg-Briand 
Pact or the Paris Pact of 1929 had provided the system of self-restrain. Preamble of the Covenant 
had provided that, “In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace 
and security, by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, … Agree to this Covenant of the 
League of Nations.” Similarly, Article 10 of the Covenant had provided that, “The Members of the 
League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity 
and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or 
in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which 
this obligation shall be fulfilled.”
82. For example, Article II of the Westphalia Treaty, 1648, had devised the system of self-restrain, 
which reads, “…the Hostilities have been practiced, in such a manner, that no body, under any 
pretext whatsoever, shall practice any Acts of Hostility, entertain any Enmity, or cause any Trouble 
to each other; neither as to Persons, Effects and Security, neither of themselves or by others, neither 
privately nor openly, neither directly nor indirectly, neither under the color of Right, nor by the way 
of Deed, either within or without the extent of the Empire, notwithstanding all Covenants made 
before to the contrary: That they shall not act, or permit to be acted, any wrong or injury to any 
whatsoever; but that all that has passed on the one side, and the other, as well before as during the 
War, in Words, Writings, and Outrageous Actions, in Violence, Hostility, Damages and Expenses, 
without any respect to Persons or Things, shall be entirely abolished in such a manner that all that 
might be demanded of, or pretended to, by each other on that behalf, shall be buried in eternal 
Oblivion.”
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another form, until the establishment of the United Nations, the actors and 
institutions were preoccupied with the idea of “just war,” despite numerous efforts 
to regulate war.83 Since history, there were always efforts to regulate war through 
the means of law, but the attempts had often failed.84 Rulers often manipulated 
politics to deny or reduce the authority of law. A ruler, Marius, declared that the 
din of arms made it impossible for him to hear the voice of law.85 The egotism of 
unruly political tendencies in regulating international relations had always stood 
as a serious problem, until it was brought under the regime of law for the first 
time with the establishment of the United Nations. Though, this unruly egoistic 
tendency often provoked by ideology and politics has made a number of attempts 
to undermine the authority of law, even after the establishment of the United 
Nations.
Early in 1946, the Security Council (SC) faced the issue of the continuation of 
the USSR army in Iran beyond the Tri-partite Agreement concluded on January 
29, 1942.86 Immediately another issue was raised in the SC of whether the 
presence and activities of the Franco regime in Spain would endanger 
international peace. The SC established a five-member Sub-Committee to 
investigate the matter.87 On the investigation of the matter, the SC took a decision 
that, “. . . to keep the situation in Spain under continuous observation and 
maintain it upon the list of matters of which it is seized, in order that it will be at 
all times ready to take such measures as may become necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.”88 The SC also received the issue of alleged 
border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, 
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other.89 The case of the Corfu Channel was more 
sensitive since Albania was not a Member of the UN. Nevertheless, with the 
efforts of the SC, Albania agreed to negotiate the issue and submit the case before 
83. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE [DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS] Kindle Location 90 
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., Lonang Institute, 2010).
84. Roman writer Ennius believed that there was nothing more common than the assertion of 
antagonism between law and arms. Horace also described that for Achilles laws declared by him 
were not ordained for him but for others because by dint of arms he claimed for himself. Referred 
in HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE [DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS] Kindle Location 90-98 
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., Lonang Institute, 2010).
85. Id.
86. See the Security Council Resolution S/RES/3, April 4, 1946.
87. Id. S/RES/4, April 29, 1946.
88. Id. S/RES/7, June 26, 1946.
89. Id. S/RES/12, Dec. 19, 1946.
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the ICJ agreeing to bear all obligations as arising to being a Member of the UN.90 
The UN moved to a new venture with the establishment of the UNTSO to monitor 
the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.91 The SC also 
established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan on 
the issue of Kashmir dispute, which started working in January 1949.92 Since 
then, both of these peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are ongoing.
The above facts show that the UN had worked comparatively smoothly in the 
beginning. With the ideological division of the world into two camps, the USSR 
and US entered into the Cold War. The long gestation period of the Cold War was 
drawn-out until 1990, which presented a number of challenges to the effective 
application of the positivist instrumentality of international law in regulating 
international relations. The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, posing a 
litmus test to the competence of the UN in maintaining peace. The General 
Assembly (GA) had already recognized the independence of the People’s Republic 
of Korea on November 14, 1947, and had also established a Commission to 
accomplish an election for a representative government.93 Against this 
background, the SC took decisions that the aggression on South Korea by North 
Korea was a breach of peace and first time invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter 
for collective defense of South Korea under the Unified Command led by the US.94 
Since the Korean War, the application of the collective defense system under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter became possible only in 1990, with the SC 
Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990, demanding Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal of 
its military force from Kuwait.
With the ensuing deadlocks in the SC, the UN resorted to the Uniting for 
Peace Decision95 to assume the role of Security Council in maintaining peace and 
90. Id. S/RES/20, Jan 20, 1947; S/RES/22, April 9, 1947.
91. Id. S/RES/50, May 29, 1948.
92. Id. S/RES/39, Jan 20, 1948; S/RES/41, April 21, 1948.
93. See the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/112(II) A, Nov. 14, 1947.
94. See the Security Council Resolutions S/RES/82, June 25, 1950; S/RES/83, June 27, 1950; S/
RES/84, July 7, 1950; S/RES/85, July 31, 1950. These decisions were taken on the backdrop of 
the boycott of the Security Council by the Soviet Union in protest of the Council’s failure to 
replace the Republic of China’s seat with the recently established People’s Republic of China. For 
detail discussion, see William Stueck, The United Nations, The Security Council, and the Korean 
War, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 
SINCE 1945, Chapter 11 (Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, & Dominik Zaum eds., 
Oxford University Press, 2010).
95. See UN General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V), Nov. 3, 1950. Section 1 of the Uniting for 
Peace Decision reads as, “Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of 
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security. However, the decision largely set-off peacekeeping missions to address 
the problems of conflicts, which did not remain unchallenged. Some powerful 
countries stopped paying their membership fees to the UN, claiming that the 
expenses of the UN, relating to PKO in Congo (ONUC)96 and the Middle East 
(UNEF) 97 followed by the Suez Canal controversy, were not legitimate. The 
General Assembly requested the ICJ for its advisory opinion. In its advisory 
opinion, the ICJ upheld the legality of the UN Peacekeeping Missions even though 
the UN Charter does not specifically mention these measures.98 Since then, the 
UN has deployed 67 PKOs; with 54 of them being deployed after 1988.99
How far these PKOs have been successful deserves to be an important 
question for examination. Nevertheless, the UN peacekeeping, originally 
developed as a means of dealing with inter-State conflict, has increasingly been 
applied to intra-State conflicts and civil wars.100 UN PKOs have increasingly been 
undertaking a wide variety of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable 
institutions of governance to human rights monitoring, from security sector 
reform to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former 
combatants, and from institutionalizing democracies to strengthening the rule of 
the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective 
measures, including in the case of a breach of peace or act of aggression the use of armed force 
when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. . .”
96. See the UN General Assembly Resolution.
97. See the UN General Assembly Resolution First Emergency Special Session, 997(ES-I), October 
30, 1956. The First United Nations Peacekeeping Force was named United Nations Emergency Force 
(UNEF I) established by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly held from 1-10 
November 1956. The mandate of the UNEF I was to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, 
including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel, and the United Kingdom from the 
Egyptian territory, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces 
and to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire. The UNEF I was withdrawn in May-June 1967 
at Egypt’s request.
98. See ELINA STEINERTE & REBECCA WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NUTCASES 196 (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2008).
99. See UN, History of Peacekeeping, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
operations/history.shtml .
100. See Dilek Latif, United Nation’s Changing Role in the Post-Cold War Era, XXX The 
Turkish Yearbook 28, 23-66, (2000). Latif argues that peacekeeping operations had been invented 
for conflict management. It was a concept not found in the Charter, but came into usage from the 
special needs of the Cold War situation. Otherwise, the UN would have been completely 
irrelevant to the maintenance of international peace and security because of the superpowers 
competition and continuous veto.
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law.101 On the whole, these PKO activities give evidence for the rules-based 
approach of international relations.
However, during the Cold War and even in the post-Cold War period, there 
have been many instances, which show the disrespect and violation of 
international rules. For example, the decade of 1980s saw a troublesome period in 
UN history. In 1979, American diplomats were taken hostage in Iran when the 
revolutionary government came into power. The Iranian government ignored the 
decisions of the SC. Fighting between China and Vietnam did not end. The French, 
and US involvements in the Vietnam War had challenged the rules-based system 
of international relations. In the meantime, the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 
December 1979. The Iran-Iraq war also began in September 1980. The SC could 
not invoke collective defense measures and remained a passive spectator. What is 
more, the decade also witnessed conflicts in Northern Ireland, guerrilla warfare in 
Malaysia, civil wars in Chad, Nicaragua, Salvador, Sri-Lanka, and Sudan. Most 
notably, the American-Vietnam War and the US military involvement across the 
globe102 defied the UN Charter and the rules of international law. Among others, 
the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 1968,103 the Israeli attack on Tunisia in 1985,104 
101. See UN PKO, Peacekeeping Operation: Principles and Guidelines, 2008, available at 
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eNg.pdf .
102. See WAYNE BERT, AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN UNCONVENTIONAL WAR: FROM THE 
PHILIPPINES TO IRAQ (Palgrave McMillan, 2011); see also BRAD D. LOOKINGBILL, AMERICAN MILITARY 
HISTORY: A DOCUMENTARY READER (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); RICHARD N. HASS, INTERVENTION: THE USE 
OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1999); IVAN MUSICART, THE BANANA WAR: A HISTORY OF US MILITARY 
INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA (McMillan Pub. Co., 1990). For detail list of American military 
actions visit http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blum/US_Interventions_WBlumZ.html.
103. The Israeli air force attacked Beirut airport in Dec. 1968. Israel attempted to justify this 
action as a response to the earlier terrorist attack on an Israeli plane at Athens airport. Israel 
claimed that Lebanese government had permitted Arab terrorist organizations to set up their 
headquarters in Beirut and to maintain a training base in Lebanon. The attack on an Israeli 
plane at Athens airport had violated the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, and Israel was 
entitled to rights of self-defense. However, the SC had unanimously denounced the Israeli attack 
with its Resolution 262 of 1968. The US also joined the condemnation. The US said that Lebanon 
had not in fact been responsible for the terrorist attack on Athens airport and the Israeli action 
was not proportionate. However, the US maintained that the Israeli action was based on the 
inherent right of self-defense. Other States in the SC did not agree with the interpretation of the 
US.
104. Israel attacked Tunisia in 1985 in response to terrorist attacks on Israelis abroad by the 
PLO. Israel claimed that Tunisia had a duty to prevent such attacks but did not fulfill it. The SC 
condemned Israeli attack by 14-0-1 votes and found the Israeli conception of self-defense was 
very far from that of international law. The US supported the Israeli claim.
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US action against Libya in 1986,105 the US invasion of Panama in 1989,106 the US 
action in Iraq in 1993,107 the US action against Al-Qaida in 1998,108 NATO action 
in Kosovo in 1999,109 US action in Afghanistan in 2001,110 and the US action in 
Iraq in 2003,111 are some of the pertinent issues in regard to the violation of the 
105. The US attacked Tripoli in 1986 in response to Libya’s involvement in terrorist attack 
against US citizens abroad. The US reported the action to the SC as self-defense under Article 
51 of the UN Charter. The US claimed that it had taken action against Libya in response to past 
terrorist attacks on its nationals and also to deter Libya in the future. Most of the Members in 
the SC rejected the US claim saying that self-defense should be narrowly interpreted and could 
not be used pre-emptively. However, the SC could not take the decision to condemn the US 
actions since the UK and France supported the US. The UK claimed that the right to self-
defense was not a passive right.
106. See LAWRENCE A. YATES, THE US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN PANAMA: ORIGINS, PLANNING, AND 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT, JUNE 1987-DECEMBER 1989 (Amazon Digital Service, Kindle Edition, 2012).
107. The US blamed Iraqi intelligence for the alleged assassination attempt on ex-President 
George Bush I in Kuwait in April 1993. The US responded in June 1993 by firing missiles at the 
Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad. The US reported the action to the SC as an act of 
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The SC showed considerable sympathy with the 
US, with only China condemning the US. Some commentators argue that this lead to a turning 
point in the arena of international law on terror, allowing a flexible approach to the invocation of 
right to self-defense.
108. The US responded to the terrorist attack by Al Qaida on its embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in August 1998 by missile attacks on a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and a 
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. The US reported its action to the SC under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. The US claimed that the actions were attempts to bring Afghanistan and Sudan to 
comply with international law. Sudan requested a meeting in the SC, but it did not take place. 
Arab States, NAMA, Pakistan, and Russia condemned the US.
109. The SC had found that the deteriorating situation in Kosovo was threating international 
peace. It had also noted that the situation was leading towards a humanitarian catastrophe. On 13th 
October 1998, NATO had issued activation orders for air strikes against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) to commence four days later, unless the FRY complied with the requirements of 
SCR. 1199. Slobodan Milosevic agreed to withdraw troops with NATO, UN welcomed the agreement. 
But the situation did not improve. NATO began air strikes on 24th March 1999 until 10 June 1999. 
India and Russia proposed the SC to take a resolution condemning the NATO invasion. UNMIK was 
established by the SC Res. 1244.
110. In the post-9/11 situation, the US started “Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)” in 
Afghanistan on 7th October 2001 with the military assistance from the UK, France, Germany, 
Australia, Canada, and others. President Bush announced that the US would make no difference 
between a terrorist and those who harbor them. The US informed the SC under Article 51 
stating that Al-Qaida was operating from Afghanistan with the support of Taliban regime. The 
US claimed that the action was based on self-defense, yet the SC did not specifically give 
permission like in the Iraq War 1990, SC Resolution 678. Though, no states in the SC condemned 
the US action.
111. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that, ‘from our point of view and the UN Charter 
point of view, it was illegal.’ The US Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador John 
Danforth responded that, ‘We don’t agree with the Secretary-General . . . Consider there were 16 
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collective defense measure under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
After 9/11 the question is: has there been a significant change in international 
law, especially in regard to the extension of Article 51, to non-state actors with or 
without complicity of a state? Particularly, with the SCR 1373 of 2001 two schools 
of thought have emerged. The first, still with the obsession of realism, argues that 
even in the absence of permission from the SC, actions can be taken against 
terrorists and actions for humanitarian interventions can be carried out in critical 
humanitarian situations as a responsibility to protect.112 The second school 
considers that the legal requirements under Article 51 of the UN Charter are not 
conditional to the events of terrorism or humanitarian situations; preconditions of 
the UN Charter should be fulfilled in resorting to the use of force even in the case 
of a self-defense.113 The ICJ in the Israel-Palestine Wall case took opportunity to 
interpret Article 51 of the UN Charter and the SC Resolutions 1368 & 1373 in its 
Advisory opinion. The ICJ observed that Article 51 of the UN Charter allows self-
defense only in the case of an armed attack by one state against another state and 
further held that these Resolutions did not support the Israeli claim of 
constructing a wall in the name of a self-defense.114 The demand for the 
application of the so-called doctrine of right to protect beyond the scope of Article 
51 has now clearly lost its legitimacy, though the West often advocates to exercise 
it beyond Article 51, whereas Asia seems constantly reluctant to any distortions of 
Security Council resolutions and Resolution 1441 held that the then government of Iraq was not 
in compliance with the previous resolutions, which is clearly the case, and promised that there 
would be serious consequences if they were not in compliance. Then the question . . . for those 
countries that were part of the coalition was . . . do all these UN resolutions mean nothing, does 
the Security Council mean nothing, is it totally ineffectual . . . It would undercut the rule of law 
had there been no action . . . So I think that action we took . . . was required if we’re going to 
maintain a rule of law.’ Cited in Legality of US-Led Invasion of Iraq, 99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 269-270 (2005).
112. See Nicholas Kerton-Johnson, Justifying the Use of Force a Post-9/11 World: Striving for 
Hierarchy in International Society, 84 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 991-1007 (2008); see also 
Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, FINNISH YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 141-175 (2002); Christopher Greenwood, International Law and War Against 
Terrorism, 78 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 301-317 (2002); Christopher Greenwood, International Law 
and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo, 49 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 926-934 
(2000).
113. See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States Revisited, 1 CHINESE JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-19 (2002); see also Ian Brownlie & C. J. Apperley, Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: 
Memorandum on the International Law Aspects, 49 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 878-
905 (2000);
114. See Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
2004 ICJ Reports 134.
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the rules based system for satiating the ambition of the realists.
The Libyan case of 2011 and the case of Mali of 2012/13 clearly establish that 
both humanitarian interventions and fighting against terrorism should be carried 
out with legitimate processes following the requirements of the UN Charter, 
especially the process of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In the 
face of colossal violations of human rights in Libya, the SC made a ‘No Fly Zone’ 
decision, which clearly authorized the Member States acting nationally or through 
regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce 
compliance with the decision.115 To defeat terrorist activities, the SC authorized116 
the use of force in coordination with Transitional Authority in Mali. From 11 
January 2013, the French force in support of other Member countries of the UN 
carried out military operation called ‘Operation Serval,’ against terrorists in the 
north of Mali at the request of the Transitional Authority in Mali.
The above-mentioned cases do not cover the full spectrum of international 
relations; however, they do show representative trends. They mainly show some 
important facts and developments. First, due to the ideological division and 
political interests of the countries, powerful counties have especially tried to 
undermine the rules of international law. Nevertheless, even in the events of the 
violations of the rule on the use of force, the violating countries have consistently 
tried to defend their actions not on the whims of politics and diplomacy but on the 
specific grounds of law, signifying the substantial position of international law in 
governing international relations. Second, the international rules and institutions 
are products of the consent and willingness of States to regulate international 
relations on predetermined standards. These standards on some occasions might 
be unhelpful to serve the vested interests of a particular country, but on the whole 
they serve the interests and welfare of the global community or society. In absence 
of international rules and institutions, the global community becomes the victim 
of global anarchy. Besides some instances of the violation of international law, 
international law has successfully contained the scourge of global anarchy. Third, 
the use of force is only one of the vantage points of international relations; many 
other areas such as human rights, international trade, international crime, the 
environment, and sustainable development have been quite successfully managed 
under the framework of international rules. Consequently, for many states, the 
management of trade has turned out to be a bigger concern than the management 
115. See the Security Council Resolution S/RES/1973, March 17, 2011.
116. Id. S/RES/2085, Dec. 20, 2012; S/RES/2083, Dec. 17, 2012.
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of armed conflict.117 Fourth, a few cases of violations do not mean that 
international law is ineffective. Both international law and domestic laws are 
violated on a daily basis across the globe. Most of these violations are settled 
either through courts or outside court proceedings. In all such cases, the bottom-
line of a solution is found in the posited rules. For example, actors have faithfully 
implemented almost all decisions of the ICJ, WTO, ICC, or other international 
dispute settlement bodies. In many cases, international rules are applied through 
the domestic process. Fifth, local interests are illusive. They are changed 
frequently. What is good for today might not be good for tomorrow. Mankind’s 
common interests and universal welfare are more stable and are a real spectrum 
for designing stable and predictable policies or rules. Thus, the undertaking of 
international relations in creating global welfare cannot be achieved without a 
rules-based system or the rule of law in place. Thus, transformation of local 
political attentions into the framework of global welfare through positive 
standards is the propelling factor of global constitutionalization to ensure global 
peace and security. Sixth, with the analysis of the above-mentioned facts and 
events, it is easily noticeable that diplomacy and international relations are 
destined for a positivist system of international rules.
5.  International Relations: Harmonization of Domestic Rules and 
Practices
Essentially, international relations have been globalized. The process is 
deepening. That is to say, they are not only internationalized, but also governed by 
uniform standards applicable to all countries and actors demanding 
harmonization of their domestic laws, policies, and administrative mechanisms to 
be compatible with the standards of international rules, with a few exceptions for 
least-developed (LDCs) and developing countries, especially in the area of 
international trade and environmental protections. With the advent of the idea of 
the most-favored nation treatment, which advanced sometime before the Second 
World War, the concept of harmonization advancing alongside the UN and more 
rigorously under the WTO. The processes of harmonization have indeed genuinely 
worked as cornerstones for the constitutionalization of international relations. 
With these developments, the process of harmonization has entrenched two 
conspicuous trends in international relations. First, uniform international 
117. Referred in David Armstrong, Theo Farrell, & Helene Lambert, International Law and 
International Relations, Kindle Location 110 (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2012).
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standards are applicable to all countries, actors, and institutions in regards to 
managing international relations. Second, countries are required to take necessary 
legislative and administrative steps in order to make their domestic laws and 
policies compatible with international rules. In turn, these two trends strengthen 
global constitutionalism.
Stephen D. Krasner summarizes the shift in international relations from ‘high 
politics’ to ‘low politics.’ During 1950s and 1960s international affairs were 
concerned primarily with military and strategic conflict, what is frequently 
referred to as high politics. In this period, international law was virtually 
neglected. A number of changes, such as independence movements, a growing 
focus on trade and business, concerns for sustainable development, the protection 
of environment, and the protection of human rights, have shifted the global focus 
to low politics, which turns out to be more salient for both policy makers and 
scholars in the post-1990 era.118
Broadly, regimes as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
have standardized and converged actors’ behaviors for desired outcomes.119 In 
other words, actors follow standard processes when engaging in international 
relations. Specifically, international rules standardize processes and transform 
norms and principles into the framework of posited rules to regulate the behaviors 
of actors for desired outcomes. Against this background, international relations 
can be perceived as the unrelenting evolvement towards global governance.120
With the shifting focus from high to low politics, more cooperative 
international order befitted the need of the day to be institutionalized through 
rules-based and uniform standards. In this connection, the UN was designed to 
take the lead on many issues of international relations including peace, security, 
human rights, environment, and sustainable development among others. The 
Bretton Woods system121 takes lead on the issues of financial stability, 
118. See generally Stephen D. Krasner, Preface to INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner 
ed., Cornell University Press, 1983).
119. See generally Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes 
as Intervening Variables in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., Cornell University 
Press, 1983).
120. For detail discussion on international relations and global governance, see Peter Kien-hong 
YU, International Governance and International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, REGIMES, 
AND GLOBALIZATION (Lexington Books, 2010).
121. The Bretton Wood system consists of three institutions established in the post-war period: 
the World Bank (WB) for reconstructing and supporting development; the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for stabilizing monetary system and exchange rate; and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which has been succeeded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
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international trade, and investment among others. In the post-Cold War era, 
another important development has taken place in culminating the efforts of 
controlling international crime into the institutionalization framework of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). These developments have established a new 
regime of international relations driven by rules-based system where uniform 
standards are applied and actors are demanded to harmonize their domestic laws 
and policies to be compatible with international rules when managing 
international relations. A few examples from the arena of human rights, 
humanitarian law, and control of international crime will elucidate the nature of 
this regime of harmonization.
International human rights law, regional human rights laws, and 
international humanitarian laws create rights for individuals and require 
governments to implement human rights through domestic mechanisms. For 
example, in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,122 the US Supreme Court found that 
the Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions was applicable to the 
conflict between the United States and a non-state terrorist organization, Al 
Qaeda. Further, the Court found that if the President wished to try Al Qaeda 
suspects before a U.S. Military Commission, U.S. law required that the commission 
operate in accordance with the Common Article 3, which in turn requires that 
such suspects only be tried before “a regularly constituted court.” The Court 
observed that “a regularly constituted court” is one, which should be created by 
statute. Thus, the Military Commission created solely by the Presidential Order 
could not try Al Qaeda suspects. In response, the US Congress enacted the 
Military Commission Act (MCA) in September 2006 that allows the trial and 
adjudication of accused Al Qaeda members held in Guantanamo Bay.
Rights created by human rights instruments are uniform. These rights are 
same to all persons living anywhere in the world,123 except for a few exceptions in 
the case of rights specifically designed only for citizens124 or a specific group or 
1995. For details on the origin of the Bretton Wood system see BENN STEIL, THE BATTLE OF BRETTON 
WOODS (Princeton University Press, 2013).
122. See 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
123. For example Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 provides 
that, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation” Article 3 further guarantees these rights both for men and women equally. Article 3 
provides that, “The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.”
124. For example Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 
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sections of society.125 These rights can be enjoyed irrespective of the distinction of 
race, sex, color, nationality, ethnic background, or other differences.126 Any person 
can enjoy these rights by virtue of being an individual. States (Parties) are 
required to create a sufficient legal regulatory environment so that individuals 
can enjoy and enforce these rights.127 All parties are required to implement human 
rights either through giving direct effect to the international human rights laws 
or by harmonizing their domestic laws and policies compatible with international 
human rights laws.128 Many Asian countries are now parties to international 
human rights laws. Nevertheless, like in other parts of the world, Asia has failed 
to develop an Asian Convention on Human Rights and consequently an Asian 
Court of Human Rights.
In many cases these international human rights instruments instill the 
provides that, “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without reasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be 
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall by universal and equal suffrage and shall be 
held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To have 
access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.”
125. For example Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 
provides that, “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members 
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use 
their own language.”
126. For example Article 2.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 
provides that, “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.” Similar 
provisions can be found in other human rights instruments as well, unless they are targeted to a 
specific group, such as women, or child.
127. For example Article 2.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 
requires each State Party to undertake, “(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as 
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person 
claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, 
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the 
legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the 
competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.”
128. For example Article 2.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 
provides that, “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each 
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with 
its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant.”
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principle of erga omnes.129 In other words, some human rights issues also create 
obligations not only to one state but also to the international community as a 
whole. For example, the Convention Against Torture (CAT) creates universal 
jurisdiction against the acts of torture committed in any part of the world (in the 
territory of State Parties) requiring a State to prosecute the offender if the 
offender is present in the territory under its jurisdiction.130 Regional human rights 
courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), exercise binding jurisdiction over 
Member States laws and policies.131 Since 1998, the ECHR has been providing 
individuals direct access to the court after the exhaustion of local remedies 
requirements. The ECHR has rendered more than ten thousand judgments. Some 
of its decisions have led to significant changes in national laws.132
The ‘democracy norm’ under the American Convention on Human Rights, 
1969, provides an interesting example of how states behaviors are shaped by 
international rules. In July 2009, the General Assembly of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) suspended Honduras after its elected government was 
deposed by a military coup. Similarly, there was often a tense relationship 
between Hugo Chavez’s government of Venezuela and the US. Nevertheless, the 
US did not support the coup against Hugo Chavez in 2002, due to the ‘democracy 
norm’ in place.133
The uniformity of human rights standards have been given effect either 
through recognizing international instruments as the part of domestic legal 
129. The principle of erga omnes has been lucidly established by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction 
Case (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 ICJ Reports 3. The ICJ held that some rights, by their very nature and 
importance, are rights that all states should protect and thus all states can be held to have legal 
obligations.
130. Article 5.2 of the Convention Against Torture provides that, “Each State Party shall 
likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences 
in cases where the alleged offered is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does 
not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this 
article.”
131. For detail discussion on the issue see Elizabeth F. Defeis, The Treaty of Lisbon and Accession 
of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, 18 ILSA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 387-394 (2012); see also Pavelas Ravluševi㶜 ius, The Enforcement of 
the Primacy of the European Union Law: Legal Doctrine and Practice, 18 JURISPRUDENCE 1369–1388 
(2011).
132. See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS Chapter 6 (Westview Press, 4th ed., 
2013).
133. See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS Chapter 6 (Westview Press, 4th ed., 
2013).
Surendra BHANDARI
40 （ 40 ）
system or by translating them into domestic human rights laws. This process has 
admirably helped the process of harmonization of domestic laws and policies 
compatible with international rules. Despite these achievements, there still seems 
to be huge gaps in the realm of harmonization and implementation of 
international human rights instruments at the domestic level. The Freedom 
House survey of human rights situations at the global level designates 48 
countries where the situation of human rights is not satisfactory. In fact, nine of 
these countries: North Korea, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Sudan, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Somalia, have been designated as 
countries where the situation of human rights is the worst. Another eight 
countries: Belarus, Burma, Chad, China, Cuba, Laos, Libya, and South Ossetia, 
have been designated as countries where human rights records are only slightly 
above those of the worst ranked countries.134 Despite the engagement in 
constitutionalization of international law, the field of human rights shows Asia as 
the part of the weakest link in the chain.
Amnesty International succinctly depicts that demands for human rights all 
over the world are continuing to resound. Millions have come out onto the streets 
of their towns and cities in a mass outpouring hopes for freedom and justice. Even 
the most brutal repression seemed unable to silence the increasingly urgent 
demands for an end to tyranny, as people showed they were no longer willing to 
endure systems of governance that were not built on accountability, transparency, 
justice and the promotion of equality. Resistance to injustice and repression took 
many forms, often inspiring acts of enormous courage and determination from the 
communities and individuals facing seemingly insuperable obstacles. In the face 
of indifference, threats and attacks, human rights defenders pursued legal 
challenges at the national and international levels against long-standing impunity 
and endemic discrimination.135
Despite these and many other challenges, civil society movements have 
enhanced public awareness and demands for the realization of human rights in 
Asia, which have somehow strengthened the process of uniformity and 
harmonization of international human rights standards. In turn, the human 
rights movement across the globe has also changed the landscape of international 
134. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2012, available at http://www.freedomhouse.
org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf .
135. See Amnesty International, The State of the World’s Human Rights, 2012, available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/air12-report-english.pdf .
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relations. As noted in the UN Charter,136 human rights have genuinely become one 
of the significant standards of international relations, which Asia cannot afford to 
ignore.
Customarily, international law treated individuals as the subject of 
international law, especially on two issues: piracy,137 and slave trading.138 Piracy 
and slave trading had long been regarded as crimes against international 
society.139 In modern times, the individual responsibility under international law 
has been expanded to many other areas including human rights, humanitarian 
laws, and other areas of international crimes. For example, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC), the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL), and the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh (ICTB)140 
are some of the examples of penalizing war criminals through the process of the 
rule of law. On top of these developments, the institutionalization of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) marks a special place in the history of 
international law and international relations. However, many Asian countries like 
China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, and others are not parties to the ICC. 
Only eighteen countries have so far been parties to the ICC from Asia-Pacific 
136. See Article 1.3 of the UN Charter, which states that the purposes of the United Nations 
are: “To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.”
137. In the Lotus case, Ser. A, No. 10 (192), dissenting Judge Moore of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice stated that, “. . . in the case of what is known as piracy by law of nations, 
there has been conceded a universal jurisdiction, under which the person charged with the 
offence may be tried and punished by any nation into whose jurisdiction he may come. . .”
138. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 619 (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed., 2008). 
Shaw writes, “. . . most of the agreements in the nineteenth century relating to the suppression 
of the slave trade provided that warships of the parties to the agreements could search and 
sometimes detain vessels suspected of being involved in the trade, where such vessels were 
flying the flags of the treaty states.”
139. Id. at 397.
140. See OHCHR, Pillay Alarmed at Sentencing of 152 Paramilitary Personnel to Death in 
Bangladesh, (November 6, 2013), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13953&LangID=E . Pillay condemning the process of the ICTB said 
that, “The crimes committed during the mutiny were utterly reprehensible and heinous, and my 
sympathies are with the grieving families, but justice will not be achieved by conducting mass 
trials of hundreds of individuals, torturing suspects in custody and sentencing them to death 
after trials that failed to meet the most fundamental standards of due process.”
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region.141 The United States also has not yet joined the ICC.
Irrespective of national boundaries and the position of a person, the ICC 
exercises jurisdiction over any person142 within the jurisdiction of its State Parties 
committing crimes prohibited by the ICC Statute (Rome Statute).143 The ICC 
exercises its jurisdiction over four specific cases,144 as follows:
•  the crime of genocide,
•  crimes against humanity,
•  war crimes, and
•  the crime of aggression.
But the ICC has its limitations. It only tries crimes committed after the ICC 
Statute came into force from July 1, 2002.145 The ICC exercises its jurisdiction on 
the basis of the referral of the crime to it by three processes, as follows:146
•  referred by State Parties to the Prosecutor of the ICC,
•   referred to the Prosecutor of the ICC by the Security Council of the UN, and
•   investigations started by the Prosecutor of the ICC on his/her own, based 
on information received.
The ICC has 121 States Parties. Out of them, 33 are African States, 18 are 
Asia-Pacific States, 18 are from Eastern Europe, 27 are from Latin American and 
Caribbean States, and 25 are from Western European and other States.147 Until, 
November 2013, 20 cases in 8 situations have been brought before the ICC. To 
date, four States Parties to the ICC: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
the Central African Republic, and Mali have been referred to the ICC regarding 
crimes that occurred on their territories. The Security Council of the UN has 
referred the cases of Sudan (Darfur), and Libya. Both of them are non-States 
Parties to the ICC, but the SC can refer such cases by exercising its power under 
141. The 18 Asian-Pacific Countries as Parties to the ICC are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Cook Islands, Cyrus, Fiji, Japan, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Korea, Mongolia, Nauru, 
Philippines, Samoa, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, & Vanuatu.
142. See Article 1 of the ICC Statute. Article 4.2 of the ICC Statute provides that, “The Court 
may exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory of any State 
Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other State.”
143. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, done at Rome on 17 July 1998, 
come into force on 1 July 2002, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20
texts%20and%20tools/Pages/legal%20tools.aspx .
144. See Articles 5-8bis of the ICC Statute.
145. See Article 11 of the ICC Statute.
146. See Articles 13-15 of the ICC Statute.
147. See ICC, the States Parties to the Rome Statute, visited on March 7, 2013; available at 
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties .
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Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Prosecutor, with the authorization from the 
pre-trial Chambers of the ICC,. has initiated the investigation in the situation of 
Kenya, and Cote d’Ivoire.148 The first case decided by the ICC was the case of 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who was found guilty on March 14, 2012, and has been 
sentenced for 14 years. He is currently in prison in The Hague. He was found 
guilty for war crimes, including the enlisting and conscription of children under 
the age of 15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities.149 Similar 
cases of conscription of child in the insurgent armies by the Maoist in Nepal has 
been found, but Nepal not being a party to the ICC, no action against the 
perpetrator could be taken by the ICC, however, the application of Chapter VII 
process cannot be ignored.
With these developments, international relations can be perceived through 
the lenses of constitutionalism underpinned in international rules designed to 
deliver uniform standards for the harmonization of state behaviors. In short, it 
can be said that international rules bind actors and their behaviors in managing 
international relations. As observed by the Global Neighborhood Report, it can be 
concluded that the very essence of global governance is the capacity of the 
international community to ensure compliance with international rules,150 which 
has reinforced the positivity of global constitutionalism.
6. Global Constitutionalism
For Carr, international relations had to be a subject of political science that 
would bring the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ together.151 Carr’s idea is comparable with the 
Hartian idea of the unity of primary and secondary rules.152 The system of anarchy 
envisioned by the realist school of international relations with the basic 
assumptions that truth statements are conditioned to power relations, that states 
148. See ICC, Situations and Cases, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx .
149. See ICC, the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_
menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/
icc%200104%200106/Pages/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo.aspx .
150. See Our Global Neighborhood: Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Chapter 
6 (Oxford University Press, 1995).
151. See Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal, Between Utopia and Reality: The Practical 
Discourses of International Relations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 7 
(Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal eds., Oxford University Press, 2010).
152. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW Chapter V (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed., 1994).
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are the only actors of international relations, and anarchy is the only reality of the 
international behaviors continuously rejected the need for transforming the ‘ought’ 
into ‘is’ domain. However, the realist resistance has undergone a sea of change 
since the emergence of the idea of global governance: the institutionalization of 
legalism, and global constitutionalism. Against the changing context of 
international relations, Hans Morgenthau also admitted that international law in 
most instances had been scrupulously observed.153
In recent days, much research in international relations has been founded on 
a positivist conception of social knowledge. Positivists generally gravitate toward 
a view of social inquiry in which patterns of human behavior are presumed to 
reflect objective principles, laws, or regularities that exist above and beyond the 
subjective orientations of actors and scholars.154 The positivist idea has also been 
proven with the shifting nature of international law from merely a law of morality 
to a law with all basic characteristics of a positivist structure: legitimacy, validity, 
and enforceability. Against this background, the Global Neighborhood Report 
claims that the standing of international law is now unquestioned. Certainly 
states are sovereign; though, they are not free to do whatever they wish. Just like 
local laws, international rules constrain the unrestrained actions of sovereign 
states.155 Indeed, international laws not only constrain states, but also empower 
them. With the development of the rules-based international system, the weaker 
and poorer countries are much more secured with their enhanced global standing 
than ever before. Certainly, the small and marginalized Asian states are the 
beneficiary of this system of global constitutionalism.
The English School’s idea about world society156 and the constructivist idea 
about legitimacy157 have necessarily elucidated the rationality of international 
153. Cited in Beth Simmons, International Law and International Relations, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS Chapter 11 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen, & Gregory 
A. Caldeira eds., Oxford University Press, 2008).
154. See Peter Katzenstein & Rudra Sil, Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of 
International Relationss, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 111 (Christian 
Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal eds., Oxford University Press, 2010).
155. See Our Global Neighborhood: Report of the Commission on Global Governance, Chapter 
6 (Oxford University Press, 1995).
156. See Tim Dunne, The English School, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
270-279 (Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal eds., Oxford University Press, 2010). For detail 
discussion on the English School, see HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN 
WORLD POLITICS (Columbia University Press, 1995).
157. For detail discussion see Beth Simmons, International Law and International Relations, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS Chapter 11 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel 
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relations projected under international law. The concept of global governance 
expressed through legalism or global constitutionalism requires states to comply 
with the entrenched international rules. The entrenchment further strengthened 
by a number of mechanisms including policy review, and settlements of disputes 
has logically heightened the authority of international law. For example, Article 
40 of the ICCPR requires State Parties to submit reports on the measures taken 
by them in regard to giving effect to the rights recognized by the ICCPR. The 
Human Rights Committee reviews the reports and makes appropriate comments. 
It is not only the Committee but also any State Party that can ask another State 
Party to provide an explanation on the implementation of the ICCPR. Each 
sovereign state is legally required to provide an explanation of its human rights 
commitments and situations to another sovereign state, if inquired.158
The concept of global constitutionalism consolidated by the idea of legalism is 
succinctly manifested in the system of global governance under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). A few examples in this regard elucidate the legalistic 
manifestation. China adopts a policy that administers export quotas, imposes 
export duties, designs minimum export price requirements, and demands export 
licensing systems to be in place, among other requirements, on rare earths, 
tungsten and molybdenum. The US, EU, and Japan considered that the domestic 
policy of China distorts global market by creating competitive advantages in favor 
of China’s domestic industries to the detriment of foreign competitors. In non-
technical terms, it poses a question of whether a country is free to decide how 
much of its natural resources should be exported. The US, EU, and Japan argue 
that the Chinese export restriction policy violates WTO rules; the dispute is now 
sub-judiced before the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel.159  Whatever decision may 
Kelemen, & Gregory A. Caldeira eds., Oxford University Press, 2008); see also STEFANO GUZZINI 
AND ANNA LEANDER, CONSTRUCTIVISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ALEXANDER WENDT AND HIS CRITICS 
(Routledge, 2005); Catherine Twomey Fosnot ed., Constructivism: Theory, Perspectives and 
Practice (Teachers College press, 2nd ed., 2005).
158. See Article 41 (a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, which 
provides that, “If a State Party to the present Covenant considers that another State Party is not 
giving effect to the provisions of the present Covenant, it may, by written communication, bring 
the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within three months after the receipt of the 
communication, the receiving State shall afford the State which sent the communication an 
explanation or any other statement in writing clarifying the matter, which should include, to the 
extent possible and pertinent, reference to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending, or 
available in the matter.”
159. See China̶Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, 
DS431/DS432/DS/433, (September 2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dispu_status_e.htm.
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come out, the point is that international bodies can review domestic policies, and 
test whether they are consistent with the international rules.
A domestic law, the US Clean Air Act, 1990 amendment, recognized two 
different standards of gasoline refinement for domestic refiners and foreign 
refiners. The law offered a lower level of standards to the domestic refiners and 
required higher level of standards to the foreign refiners. Venezuela, whose 
gasoline exports to the US constitute an important segment of its economy, was 
affected by the US law. Venezuela challenged the US law and practices before the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, calling them discriminatory and inconsistent with 
WTO rules. In its first decision, the Appellate Body of the WTO declared that 
Section 211(k) of the US Clean Air Act violated the WTO rules.160 The WTO 
required the US to make the Clean Air Act compatible with the WTO rules. The 
US, for first time in its history, amended its laws as directed by an international 
agency.161
The Indian Patent Act did not provide a system of patent protection for 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products. It also lacked a formal system 
of permitting the filing of patent applications for pharmaceutical and agricultural 
chemical products. It also did not provide exclusive marketing rights for such 
products. The US considered the Indian patent regime inconsistent with the WTO 
rules and asked the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to rule on the issue requiring 
India to make its patent regime compatible with the WTO. The Appellate Body 
recommended that the Dispute Settlement Body request India to bring its 
domestic legal regime for patent protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural 
chemical products into conformity with India's obligations under Articles 70.8 and 
70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement.162 India subsequently changed its domestic laws 
relating to patent regime in order to comply with the WTO decision.163
The EC prohibited importation of beef products containing artificial hormones 
160. See Appellate Body, United States ̶ Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (April 29, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_
e/cases_e/ds2_e.htm.
161. See WTO, Venezuela, Brazil versus US: Gasoline, available at https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/envir_e/edis07_e.htm . The United States had agreed with Venezuela that it would amend 
its regulation within 15 months, and on 26 August 1997 it had reported to the Dispute Settlement 
Body that a new regulation had been signed on 19 August 1997.
162. See Appellate Body, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds50_e.htm.
163. See WTO, Implementation Notified by Respondent, (April 28, 1999), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds50_e.htm.
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from the US on the ground of public policy and safety under various EC directives. 
This case is also known as the Hormone Dispute or Mad Cow disease case. The 
EC prohibited importation of beef products from many countries outside Europe 
including from Australia, Canada, and the US. The major argument of the EC was 
that the meat products from those countries were potentially harmful for human 
health. The EC had imposed import restrictions on the basis of precautionary 
principles. The US, Canada, Australia, and other countries argued that the EC’s 
suspicion was not based on scientific evidence. The major dispute was over the 
issue of whether the EC could impose trade restrictions on the basis of public 
policy and political understanding. The Appellate Body found that the EC 
directives were not consistent with the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement 
(SPS) of the WTO and thus asked the Dispute Settlement Body to request the EC 
to bring its directives to be compatible with the SPS Agreement.164 The EC did not 
comply with the WTO decision on time. The US asked the WTO to authorize 
sanctions against the EC. On 26 July 1999, the WTO authorized sanctions against 
the EC of the amount equivalent to the loss suffered by the US, being $116.8 
million.165
The above-mentioned examples elucidate the nature of global constitutionalism. 
In other words, domestic laws, policies, and practices are required to be compatible 
with international laws. International laws assume the position of supremacy like a 
constitution. State Parties bear an obligation to ensure that their domestic laws and 
policies give effect to international rules.  Paulus writes that in the same vein in 
which a constitution unifies the domestic polity in one legal superstructure, a 
developed institutional reading of international law would unify the international 
community in a single coherent constitutional structure.166 Trachman observes that 
the international legal system indeed has a constitution, with enabling, constraining, 
and supplemental features. He further claims that there is also no doubt that the 
WTO constitution is a part of this broader constitution.167
164. See Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/
DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm .
165. See WTO, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/
R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Sept. 25, 20009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds26_e.htm .
166. See Andreas L. Paulus, The International Legal System as a Constitution, in RULING THE 
WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 69 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & 
Joel P. Trachtman eds., Cambridge University Press, 2009).
167. See Joel P. Trachman, Constitutional Economics of the World Trade Organization, in RULING 
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These examples also elucidate the legalistic framework of international rules. 
For example, WTO trade negotiations carry out three activities: they formulate 
new rules, amend existing rules, and instruct WTO Members to change their 
domestic laws, policies, and administrative mechanisms. The conclusion of the 
trade negotiations agreed by Members will come into force through the regular 
treaty-making process, which reflects the legislative process. In addition, laws are 
also made through an interpretative adjudicatory mechanism under the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB). The DSB adopts the decisions of the Appellate Body and 
Panels that establish a body of jurisprudence practically, which is different from 
legislation in the sense that it is the adjudicatory process, which interprets rules 
and reviews the compatibility of domestic laws and policies. Along with these 
legislative and adjudicatory processes, the WTO also has a powerful enforcement 
system. These developments are not unique to the WTO alone; today these are 
common in international legal regimes, nevertheless, the WTO framework of 
constitutionalization is one of the most accomplished one that we have today.
Law as a science is all about the explication of the nature of a legal concept. 
By the same token, this is also true in the arena of international law. 
International law is shaped at an unprecedented level in reaction to the 
globalization of legal concepts. As one of the most catalytic processes of today’s 
international relations, international law is profoundly transforming international 
relations from a simple diplomatic form to a structure, which is based on rules. 
These rules at the global level are institutionalizing a system of global governance. 
The nature of this system of global governance is fundamentally designed by the 
very concept of global constitutionalism. Making rules at the global level is 
therefore profoundly important, as it demands states to regulate their relations 
and provide necessary institutions, including laws, for the effective cooperation in 
the global system. As a result, the demand for law as an ordering structure of 
globalization is progressively institutionalizing a global legal system.168
7. Conclusion
In Dunoff and Pollack’s account, the detachment between international 
relations (IR) and international law (IL) had been stretched wide apart, even after 
the Second World War when political scientists, predominately realists, rejected 
THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 228 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff 
& Joel P. Trachtman eds., Cambridge University Press, 2009).
168. See BHANDARI, supra note.
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the notion that international law could serve as a meaningful constrain on states’ 
pursuit of national interests.169 However, the fact that after the establishment of 
the United Nations (UN), states have concluded over 180,000 treaties and related 
subsequent actions, which have been published in the UN Treaty Series of over 
2,600 volumes. Also, during the period of the League of Nations, a number of 
treaties were concluded and published in 205 volumes of the League of Nations 
Treaty Series.170 These facts demonstrate that states were continuously engaged 
in designing international relations with the mechanisms of international law 
despite the reluctance of the realists. Consequently, international law has been 
evolving as a thoughtful apparatus for managing international relations. In this 
context, we could agree with Justice Owada that Asia, being one of the most 
important and vibrant regions of the world in international affairs, is gaining an 
active and influential role in the realm of international relations.171
Some observers view that nation-states have remained preeminent until the 
current era of globalization, a time when global flows began to undermine the 
nation-state.172 Ohame contends that, in terms of the global economy, nation-states 
have become little more than bit actors.173 Khan radically observes that due to 
increased interdependence among the peoples of the world, the nation-state has 
become dysfunctional in serving the needs of global life.174 Perhaps, some may find 
these observations as slight overstatements. Nevertheless, the recent 
developments have signified the governing role of international law in managing 
international relations and defining the nature of constitutionalism as the 
impetus of global governance. In this regime of global governance, the relationship 
between IR and IL has become more welcoming and symbiotic than ever before. 175
169. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, International Law and International Relations: 
Introducing an Interdisciplinary Dialogue, in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International 
Law and International Relations
170. See UN, United Nations Treaty Collection, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
Overview.aspx?path=overview/overview/page1_en.xml .
171. See Hisashi Owada, Asia and International Law, 1 ASIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 
3-11 (2011).
172. See GEORGE RITZER, GLOBALIZATION THE ESSENTIALS Kindle Location 3172 (Wiley-Blackwell, 
2011).
173. Cited in GEORGE RITZER, GLOBALIZATION THE ESSENTIALS Kindle Location 3197 (Wiley-Blackwell, 
2011); see also KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES (Free 
Press).
174. See generally L. ALI KHAN, THE EXTINCTION OF NATION-STATES: A WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS 
(Kluwer Law International 2011).
175. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, & Stepan Wood, International Law and 
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Welcoming international law as the governing apparatus of global 
constitutionalism, this paper appreciates the instrumental role of international 
law in managing international relations. Some of the major findings and 
conclusions of this paper can be stated as follows:
•   First, through a domestic legal process, the rules of international law are 
being transformed into domestic legal systems in enhancing the 
harmonization between domestic and international laws. In this course, 
either necessary laws are enacted to give effect to international laws or 
international laws are contemplated as a part of the domestic legal system.
•   Second, international judicial decisions inspire necessary changes and 
reform in domestic legal systems through reviewing the compatibility of 
domestic laws and policies with international laws.
•   Third, through international negotiations, international laws also embody 
legal concepts and practices grown in different legal systems, implying a 
truly global nature of international rules, which is reflexive of the global 
legislative process. Though, due to the widespread continuation of biases 
and asymmetries in negotiations, especially in transmuting concepts into 
rules, the legitimacy of rules have often been called into questions.
•   Fourth, the growing compliance and implementation of bilateral, regional, 
and multilateral agreements evidence constitutionalism as the touchstone 
of global governance.
•   Fifth, with the emergence of global constitutionalism, domestic laws, policies, 
and administrative practices are demanded to be compatible with 
international laws. International laws are progressively assuming the 
position of supremacy over domestic laws like a constitution. State Parties 
are not free to eschew their obligations from giving effect to international 
laws. These minimum obligations of harmonization, supremacy, and authority 
of international law have shaped the process of constitutionalizing 
international law, which has already garnered the requisite legitimacy. In 
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 American 
Journal of International law 367-397, 393 (1998).  They observe that, “IR and IL have 
rediscovered one another. A new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship has emerged, 
acknowledging that the disciplines represent different faces of and perspective on the same 
empirical and/or inter-subjective phenomena. Outsiders might categorize them as dividing the 
study of the international system in terms of positive versus normative, politics versus law. 
Insiders in both disciplines reject such facile distinctions. The reasons for the periodic divergence 
and reconvergence of the two fields have had more to do with the internalization of external 
events such as the Cold War and its end and the externalization of the internal dynamics of 
theory building and purported paradigm shifting.”
Global Constitutionalism and the Constitutionalization of International Relations: A Reflection of Asian Approaches to International Law
（ 51 ） 51
this regard, one of the obligations as well as contributions of Asia in 
constitutionalizing international relations can be attributed to its 
participation in strengthening the practice of global constitutionalism.
Against this background, this paper has gauged the constitutionalization of 
international relations as a metamorphic process in buttressing a trans-boundary 
transformation of legal concepts. Managing the possible modes and results of such 
a metamorphic process is at the forefront of the socio-economic, political, and legal 
discourse in Asia too. The opportunities can be found when there are harmonious, 
predictable and objective legal standards across the globe enabling an 
environment for international relations, especially in the field of international 
business, trade, and human rights, among others. The challenges are impregnably 
coupled with the internal resistance from countries to the gradually diminishing 
role of the traditional concept of sovereignty. The challenges are further 
aggravated with a lack of the capacity to implement the one-size-fits-all 
international standards at the domestic level.
Also, global governance176 is not a substitute for the nation-state. In fact, with 
the advent of global constitutionalism, nation-states are not only constrained, but 
also empowered and facilitated. As suggested by Whitman177 and Ritzer,178 this 
paper endorses the concept of governance in three different levels. First, local 
communities in support of civil society organizations and other community groups 
manage a number of local issues without the direct involvement of government, 
which can be called governance without government. Second, many actors like 
multinational corporations, business entities, the private sector, civil society 
organizations, academia, journalists, and other stakeholders engage in public 
policy issues without direct control and involvement of government, which can be 
stated governance through various public policy networks. Third, globalization 
institutionalized through international rules and institutions, which is reflexive of 
governance at the global level. In fact, unlike the claim of Ritzer that these three 
176. Rosenau contends that there is a difference between governance of the world and governance 
in the world. The term ‘global governance’ does not necessarily refer to a central authority. Rather, 
global governance is a lot of governmental and nongovernmental activities that occur in local places, 
the results of which contribute to the overall order of world affairs. Cited in Jim Whitman, Global 
Dynamics and the Limits of Global Governance, 17 GLOBAL SOCIETY 253-272, 253 (2003).
177. See Jim Whitman, Global Dynamics and the Limits of Global Governance, 17 GLOBAL SOCIETY 
253-272 (2003).
178. See GEORGE RITZER, GLOBALIZATION THE ESSENTIALS Kindle Location 3464 (Wiley-Blackwell, 
2011); see also KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES 
(Free Press, 1996).
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forms of governance have caused the decline of the nation-state;179 as discussed 
above this paper contends that with these developments sovereign integrity of 
countries has been further strengthened, domination and unruly behaviors of 
powerful countries has been largely contained, and uniform standards of 
international cooperation have been institutionalized, which indeed strengthen 
the sovereignty of nation-states. For the overall growth of Asia, these 
developments seem more soothing and advantageous.
William James once told that, “. . . the course of history is nothing but the 
story of men’s struggle from generation to generation to find a more inclusive 
order.”180 In this light, global constitutionalism may be taken as the apogees or 
culminations of international relations resulting from trans-border human efforts. 
The rapid changes occurring in the international legal order highlight a movement 
away from the old juristic approach. The issues that we used to traditionally 
consider the exclusive matter of the domestic jurisdiction of a state, some of them 
have already converged into the global or multilateral domain. It has become 
possible because the process of multilateralism is chipping away at the parochial 
ideology of territorialism. Though, it is true that this optimism might take a long 
time to be an unflinchingly acceptable universal standard.
Jurgen Habermas181 argues for supra-national capacity in managing the 
framework of globalization. This supra-national capacity requires juristic support 
in identifying legal concepts suitable for and complementary to constitutionalism. 
It encourages the analysis of the future of law in the era of globalization. William 
Twining, responding to the scope, depth, and range of transformation of law and 
legal concepts by globalization, calls for a thorough rethinking of the process. 
Twining believes that constitutionalization offers fundamental challenges to the 
179. Id.
180. See Roscoe Pound, Preface, quoted in EUGENE G. GERHART, AMERICAN LIBERTY & NATURAL 
LAW 3 (Boston, The Beacon Press 1953).
181. See Herbert Dittgen, World Without Borders? Reflections on the Future of the Nation-
State, 34 GOVERNMENT & OPPOSITION 2, quoted at 166 (1999). The passage reads, “The nation-state 
once provided a convincing response to the historic challenge to provide in the process of 
dissolution of a functional equivalent to pre-modern forms of social integration. Today, we are 
faced with an analogous challenge. The globalization of economic production and it’s financing of 
technology and arms transfers, and particularly of ecological and military risks confronts us 
with problems which cannot be solved within the framework of the nation-state or by the usual 
kind of agreements between sovereign states. If the signs are not deceiving the nation-state’s 
sovereignty will continue to be undermined, and the supra-national capacity for political action 
must be developed and consolidated.”
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contemporary legal theory and thinking. 182
In conclusion, in the 20th century and previous eras, the issue of governance 
had exclusively fitted into the jurisdiction of domestic regime but excluding the 
substantial participation of people in the process of governance. With the growth 
of the idea of constitutionalization of international law, the participation of people 
both at local and international policy making processes has been significantly 
enhanced. In short, constitutionalization of international law is considerably 
changing the pattern of international relations and cooperation among sovereign 
states, as envisaged by Woodrow Wilson; the jungle of international politics would 
turn into a zoo by the system of the rule of law.183 The growing process and effects 
of constitutionalism will not only demand the international actors to be 
responsible but also respect the supremacy of international law, which is 
correspondingly applicable and suitable to shape the Asian approach to 
international law. Despite diversity, in all its likelihood, Asia seems to be gradually 
advancing its role from a bystander to the partner of global constitutionalism, in 
terms of transmuting concepts into international rules, harmonizing them at the 
domestic level, and implementing them in practice.  This approach seems 
expedient in enabling Asia to redeem its active partnership and responsibility in 
the process of constitutionalizing international relations and upkeep its 
constructive engagement in transforming the international system from anarchy 
to constitutionalized order.
182. See generally WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE (Cambridge University Press, 2009); see also WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALIZATION AND 
LEGAL THEORY (Northwestern University Press, 2001).
183. See ANDREW HEYWOOD, GLOBAL POLITICS 65 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

